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What's Wrong With Restitution?
David Stevens' and Jason W. Neyers"
The law ofrestitution has developed out ofthe law
ofquasi-contract and the law of constructive trust.
Inadequate attention to the logic and coherence of
doctrines in the law ofrestitution, however, renders
this new law as opaque and confused as its
predecessor. This is largely due to the remedial
mentality of the common law. The remedy to the
remedial mentality is to concentrate future efforts in
stating doctrine on defining rights, not remedies.
The precedent for this type of change in method is
the transformation that occurred in contract and
tort over the past 100 years, inspired, in part, by
civilian theories ofprivate law.
The right that generates the remedy restitution is
the cause of action in unjust enrichment. It arises
where there has been a non-consensual receipt and
retention ofvalue, that is, a receipt and retention of
value that occurs without "juristic reason." "Non-
consensual" means by mistake, by theft or by
finding.
There are a number ofproblems in the method of
the common law tradition which stand in the way of
recognizing this simple formulation: (a) The
inherent expansiveness of "restitution " and "unjust
enrichment" if these terms are not rigorously
defined; (b) The lack of serious competition for the
expansive versions of the subject, on a number of
fronts; (c) The lack of a clear direction in the
efforts to reform the law of quasi-contract and
constructive trust; (d) The deeply embedded nature
ofthe quasi-contract thinking; (e) Poor analysis in
some areas of the law ofcontract and (f) Tort; and
(g) The lack ofan explicit agency of reform in the
tradition.
Le droit en matiere de restitution emane du droit
du quasi-contrat et du droit de la ftducie
d'interpretation. Mais I'attention insufftsante
accordie a la logtque et a la cohirence des
doctrines du droit en matiere de restitution rend ce
nouveau droit aussi opaque etfiou que le pricident,
ce qui est largement altribuable a la mentaliti
remediatrice du common law. Lafafon de contrer
celte mentaliti est d'axer les efforts futurs de
definition de la doctrine sur la definition des droits
et non des reparations. Ce changement dans la
facon de prodder a son origine dans la
transformation survenue dans le droit contractuel et
le droit de la responsabilile' delictuelle au cours des
cent dernieres annies, et inspires, en parlie, des
theories civiles de droit prive.
Les actions en matiere de restitution ont pour
objeclif de remidier a I'enrichissement sans cause,
c 'est-a-dire la reception injusle et la retention d'une
valeur sans motifjuridique et sans consentement —
a la suite d 'une erreur, d 'un vol ou d 'une decouverte
fortuile.
La methode de la tradition de common law
comporte certains problemes qui empechenl de
reconnoitre cette simpleformulation: a) le caractere
expansif inherent de la restitution et de
I'enrichissement sans cause; b) /'absence de
concurrence scheuse pour les versions expansives
du sujet sur plusieurs fronts; et c) I'absence de
direction claire de la reforme du droit du quasi-
contrat et de la fiducie d"interpretation; et g)
I'absence d'uneagence explicite de reforme dans la
tradition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to the purposes they serve
would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting truth. The notion that law exists as a means to an end
has been commonplace Tor at least half a century. There is, however, no justification for assuming,
because this altitude has now achieved respectability, and even triteness, that it enjoys a pervasive
application in practice. Certainly there arc even today few legal treatises of which it may be said that
the author has throughout clearly defined the purposes which his definitions and distinctions serve. We
arc still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts without
the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed?
Nietzsche's observation, that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to
do, retains a discomforting relevance to legal science.1
Lon Fuller and William R. Perdue wrote these words over sixty years ago. They
form the first paragraph of their celebrated article, "The Reliance Interest in Contract."
The concepts introduced and developed in that article - the "reliance interest" in
particular, but also, the "restitution interest" and the "expectation interest" - and the
role given these concepts in their theory of contract damages, have had a profound
influence on the development of private law in the English-speaking world. There have
been few similarly innovative private law concepts — one thinks of "security interest,"
"unconscionability," "inequality ofbargaining power," "the oppression remedy" — that
have had as much impact on the development of the law as the "reliance interest."
It is suggested in the introduction to this paper that the argument of "The Reliance
Interest in Contract" rests on four related errors that have, over the years, been
responsible for as much harm in the development of Anglo-American private law as the
arguments in the article originally sought to remedy.2 These same errors, which are
L. Fuller & W.R. Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract" (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 52 at 52, (1937)
46 Yale L.J. 373.
The original contribution sought to remedy the common law's (and (lie Restatement's)
preoccupation with expectation damages and restitution and its consequent distortion of the
availability of reliance damages. It did this in part by analyzing the kinds of loss that can occur
on a breach of contact and the logical relationship among the various kinds of loss. All of this was
original and path-breaking. The article also argued that the reliance interest is mainly promissory
and therefore, wherever the impulse to protect it occurs, there generally is a promise, even if the
law docs not consider that promise legally binding or enforceable. That was also an original and
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characteristic of Anglo-American legal reasoning generally, have had a singularly
negative influence on the development of the law of restitution. In starting with the
errors of two eminent American jurists, it is not our intention to isolate their article for
any particular blame. Although the arguments expressed in it constituted a highly
original contribution to the private law scholarship of its time, much of what Fuller and
Perdue wrote was a reformulation or a clearer articulation of already existing common
law thinking on contract damages. Their method of argument was characteristically of
the common law tradition. "The Reliance Interest in Contract" was and remains a
milestone in common law scholarship as much because of its resonance with existing
themes and currents of thought, as for the quality and originality of the thought.
The first mistake is contained in the opening claim just quoted. They state that the
key to the resolution of most problems in the law of contract damages is to be found
in the "purposes" or "functions" of contract law. Still early in the argument, they
express this thought in the following way: it is "impossible to separate the law of
contract damages from the larger body of motives and policies which constitutes the
general law of contracts."3 To be sure, it would be misguided to maintain that social,
economic and moral contexts of contract law arc irrelevant to its explanation or
understanding. It is hardly debatable that the precise scope of contractual ordering in
society is something about which there is much choice and that in this determination
issues relating to the proper purposes of contract law should be addressed. That said,
however, the starting point of any legal inquiry into the law of contract ought to be
with the form or idea of contract, not, as Fuller and Perdue suggest, with its function.4
Stated differently, in an investigation of damages in contract, one should start with what
contract is, not why contract is.5 Yet Fuller and Perdue expressly set this formal
question aside as a "conceit" based on a naive belief in the possibility of
"manipulating" legal concepts.6
valuable contribution.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note I at S3.
The notion that the law of contract and the law of contract damages is explicable entirely in terms
of some social policy was picked up in subsequent writings. Sec e.g., IV Aliyali, The Rise and Fait
ofFreedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); I..M. Friedman, Contract Law In America, A
Social and Economic Case Study (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); G. Gilmorc, The
Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974); M.J. Horwitz, The
Transformation ofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1977); and
I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Sec also, C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of
Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) at 3, where he wrote: "(l]t
is a point of some of these critics ... that the search for a central or unifying principle of contract
is a will-o'-the-wisp, an illusion typical of the ill-dcfincd but much excoriated vice of
conccptualism. These critics hold that the law fashions contractual obligation as a way to do justice
between, and impose social policy through, parties who have come into a variety of relations with
each other...."
Similarly, modem social policy analysis is built on fairly rigorous definitions of the foundational
precepts. Ilicse arc assumed or expressly supplied and include the first law of demand in
economics and the impossibility theorem in social choice theory.
Maybe all that Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, meant by this is that legal concepts available in the
common law tradition at the time of the writing of that article were unhelpful in understanding law
and solving disputes, and that the purposes of contract law referred to throughout their article are
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This functional orientation in their argument leads to two further errors. In setting
out to discover the purposes "which may be pursued in awarding contract damages,"7
Fuller and Perdue claimed it did not matter
how the suit in such a case be classified, whether as contractual or quasi-contractual, whether as a suit
to enforce the contract or as a suit based upon a rescission of the contract These questions relate to
the superstructure of the law, not to the basic policies....*
Thus setting the formal questions to one side, they proceeded to identify the three
"purposes" of contract damages: the protection of the plaintiffs restitution interest or
the prevention of unjust enrichment; the protection of the plaintiffs expectation (gross
and net) interest; and the protection of the plaintiff s reliance (essential and incidental)
interest. They observed that the first may be a special case of the third. In a peculiar
passage they said:
If, following Aristotle, we regard Ihe purpose ofjustice as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods
among members of society, the restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial
intervention as the reliance interest, since ir A not only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that
unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.*
This is peculiar because it suggests that claims to judicial intervention are capable of
quantification.10 The first of these aforementioned errors is the dual transformation in
really just what we are referring to here as the cause of action for breach of contract. The
instrumentalist rhetoric of their analysis might be explicable on the basis that it was the fashion
of the time. Certainly, the first point - about the inadequacy of available legal concepts - is true,
but is perennially true and dealing with it is one of the tasks of the academic lawyer. Perhaps their
aspiration was the same as Lord Wright expressed in the following passage from a
contemporaneous article on a related topic: "One result must be that a large part of the cases in
the books become superannuated, as dealing with obsolete views of forms ofaction.... The student
of English law must lcam to distinguish what appertains to the substance of the law. He cannot
now excuse himself Trom a logical analysis of causes of action." See L. Wright, "Case Comment
on United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd." (1941) 57 L.Q. Rev. 184 at 198. But in the end,
we have opted for a less charitable reading of their intention on this score, partly because of
subsequent events and partly because their rhetoric against formalism is so strong. See, e.g., their
second paragraph which reads: "In no field is this more true than in that of damages. In the
assessment of damages the law tends to be conceived, not as a purposive ordering of human
affairs, but as a kind of juristic mensuration. The language of the decisions sounds in terms not
of command but of discovery. We measure Ihe extent of the injury; we determine whether it was
caused by the defendant's act; we ascertain whether the plaintiff has included the same item of
damage twice in his complaint. One unfamiliar with the unstated premises which language of this
sort conceals might almost be led to suppose that Rochester produces some ingenious instrument
by which these calculations arc accomplished." See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1 at 52.
Fuller & Perdue, ibid, at S3.
Ibid, at 54.
Ibid, at 56.
J. Dawson made a similar point in Unjust Enrichment. A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1951) at 5: "But if this loss can be located and identified in the gain received by
another, the anguish caused by the loss will be felt as more than doubled." The idea underlying
these two observations is that Ihe justness ofa plaintiffs claim where there is an unjust enrichment
is perhaps more obvious than where the claim is based in civil responsibility or contract We are
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the discussion from (1) the nature of contract to a discussion about the nature of
remedies for breach of contract, and then (2) from the nature of the remedies available
for a violation of rights to a discussion of the interests protected by those remedies. It
is contended that this is a move away from the category of corrective justice to
something else, perhaps desire, perhaps distributive or discretionary justice. The
difficulty this move creates is that it subsequently becomes logically problematic to
express the idea that the nature of the remedy is necessarily determined by the nature
or kind of right violated and the manner of its violation. The second error of this
functional approach is the isolation of "restitution" as an organizing idea in private law.
Fuller and Perdue identify it as an interest in the context of contract law, but it
subsequently became a category of private law obligation in its own right." These two
ideas together invert and contort the Latin maxim — ubi jus, ubi remedium — into
"here is a remedy, what is the explanation?" The direction of inquiry is subsequently
diverted from a search for the proper formulation of the rights to the search for
"explanations" for remedies.
The last mistake of this seminal article is the argument that the justification for
expectation damages is especially problematic because expectation damages do not
correspond to any plausible interpretation of compensation. They claim that expectation
damages are therefore an instance of distributive justice, not corrective justice, and in
protecting the expectation interest, the law "ceases to act defensively or restoratively,
and assumes a more active role."12 In their search for a justification for expectation
damages, they settled on a two-part "juristic" explanation." The first part of this
explanation is that protecting "expectation" serves as a surrogate for protecting what
they clearly perceived to be the more important reliance interest, since the promisee's
reliance on the promise includes the promisee's forgoing other opportunities. This is the
opportunity cost of contracting with the promisor. The second part of the explanation
is that protecting reliance in this way serves to promote it and that, in turn, facilitates
commerce. This juristic explanation is complemented by an "economic" explanation to
the effect that the distinction between present and promised value is eliminated in a
credit economy and, therefore, the expectancy created by a promise in present property
which is injured on breach. Since this second argument assumes that a promise is
legally enforceable, it does not explain why a promise is legally enforceable. Instead,
Fuller and Perdue, saw the juristic and economic arguments as complementary and as
constitutive of the foundations of contract. Their mistake was their failure to discern
not sure that this is true, but it might be. The victim of a theft certainly has an appealing argument
for the return of the stolen article. The appeal of that claim may or may not be stronger or more
obvious than the appeal of the claim made by the victim of a broken promise to at least the value
of the promise, and the appeal by the claim of the victim of somebody else's carelessness to
compensation for the loss caused.
There were many other influences in this development besides that of Fuller & Perdue. For the
origins of the terminology, see, e.g., L. Hand, "Restitution or Unjust Enrichment" (1897) 11 Harv.
L.R. 249 and Restatement of the Law ofRestitution, QuasiContracts and Constructive Trusts (St.
Paul: American Law Institute, 1937) at 1-10 [hereinafter Restatement of Restitution].
Fuller & Perdue, supra note I at 56.
Ibid, at 58-64.
226 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW VOL. 37(1) 1999
the true "form of contract" and in light of that, the essentially unproblematic nature of
expectation damages.
It is "trite," as they said, to recognize that there are reasons for having contract law,
there are reasons why individuals make contracts, that contract law can be explained,
and that people have and pursue interests. It is equally true, but not, in the common law
tradition, necessarily trite, to observe that the thing we have — "contract" — is capable
of definition prior to its use. Contract is constitutive of rights not interests, the
characteristic (but not sole) right it creates is the right to the prestation14 of the
promise — the "expectation interest." The remedial response of "restitution" is
inadequate as an organizing idea in law because it names something that follows a
violation of a right and therefore, logically, must come after a description of rights.1'
Fuller and Perdue, however, said to the contrary:
If these ancient boundaries were erased, it would become possible to analyse the general problem of
the legal sanction to be given expectancies created by words or conduct in terms of the policies
involved, and it would be perceived that these policies cut across distinctions in the "nature" of the
obligation. This would in turn promote a desideratum already recognized, — that the obvious (though
generally uncxamined) interrelations of contract, deceit, estoppel, and warranty be brought into some
coherent pattern."'
Yet the coherent pattern for which they searched lies in the very "nature" of the
obligation which they, and others following them, set aside at the outset.
Our intention in this paper is to offer a partial answer to the question that is the title
of this paper: What is Wrong with Restitution? The thesis of this paper is that the body
of law that is called "restitution" is lacking a description of the right or rights that
ground its remedy. The start with "The Reliance Interest in Contract" is relevant
because the errors identified there are the principal errors in this area of law. The first,
the exclusive, or at least premature, preference for function over form, is not as
theoretically advanced in the law of restitution compared to the law of contract. This
is partly because the underlying form has not been fully identified and therefore, is not
as easily corrupted. The functional explanations one finds in the law of restitution are
less grand, more intuitive: restitution lawyers speak of "policy" reasons or doctrinal
"rigidity" or historical error in their explanations, as opposed to, say, "efficiency"
reasons. The second error is the failure to construe judicial responses as merely
vindications of prior rights. The third related error is the tendency to focus on remedies,
and restitution in particular, as a subject worthy of study in itself. Here, the irony of our
present difficulties is especially poignant. The antidote that the legal community now
A prcslation is the "object of an obligation ... that the debtor is bound to render to the creditor and
which consists in doing or not doing something." See Art. 1373 Civil Code ofQuebec (hereinafter
C.C.Q.].
As I*. Birks argues the word "restitution" cannot stand in the same scries as "contract" or "tort."
"Contract" and "tort" denote "events" which trigger legal responses while "restitution" denotes a
response triggered. See P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1985) at 9-12 [hereinafter Birks, Introduction].
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1 at 419.
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applies to remedy the doctrinal confusion inherited from the quasi-contract and
constructive trust fictions is in fact the very poison from which it suffered — the
preoccupation with remedies. The fourth error is the failure of the common law to
discern the true nature of the "restitution" argument, the cause of action in unjust
enrichment and, therefore, the unproblematic nature of the subject. In short, all of these
related errors arise from the view that the controlling or master normativity in private
law is to be found at the level ofjudicial remedies, when, in fact, remedies arc driven
entirely by rights and circumstances. Name the right, define it, and the rest is mere
application in light of the circumstances. More juris, less prudence.
The argument of the paper is divided into two parts. The first part outlines a
preferable way of thinking about private law doctrine and, in particular, the law of
restitution. The second part identifies specific doctrinal barriers in the way of moving
to the preferable structure. All of these doctrinal barriers, more or less, have arisen
because of the way we think about private law.
The preferred way is the way of the civil law tradition, but solely as a matter of
mentality, not doctrinal outcomes. The precedent for this leap from common law to
civil law epistemology is the leap common lawyers made a century ago when they
adopted the ideas of contract and tort from the civil law to rationalize the law in these
areas.17 The next steps in this process are more difficult for a variety of reasons. Some
of these will emerge as we progress through the arguments in this essay. Essentially,
the theme is that the move out of quasi contract and the constructive trust is stalled
because of tradition's pragmatic and functional mentality.
It might be thought that if even a quarter of what is about to be said is true, the
common law tradition is on the verge of some sort of disaster. That, however, is not
a part of the argument, nor does it necessarily follow. Perhaps the worst that will
happen is that civilians will continue to be amused by the poverty of our legal
reasoning, which is very clearly conveyed to them as much by the incoherence of our
legal doctrines, as by the defection of common law legal academics to other disciplines
for sources of intelligibility. The argument presented here is concerned largely with the
common law as an intellectual tradition and therefore with intellectual vices and virtues,
such as coherence, consistency and intelligibility. These virtues probably contribute less
to the efficacy or justness of the law than other factors, such as the judge's respect for
the facts, his or her desire to establish an authentic narrative of the case, and his or her
regard for justice. Even though giving reasons and deciding like cases alike is of some
For a description of this process, see J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract
Doctrine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) [hereinafter Cordley] at 134 ft See also, A.W.B.
Simpson, History of the Common l-aw of Contract: The Rise of the Action ofAssumpsit (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, I97S) and A.W.B. Simpson, "The Horowitz Thesis and the History ofContracts"
(1979) 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533. For an argument that civil law tradition significantly informed the
common law in earlier times, see P. Vinogradoff. Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 2d. ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929) at 97 where the author states: "Civil law did not become a
constituent clement of English common law acknowledged and enforced by the courts, but it
exercised a potent influence on the formation of legal doctrines during the critical twelfth and
thirteenth centuries...."
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importance, these tasks need only be done or achieved, most of the time, to a
reasonable standard. One of the few virtues of the common law methodology is that
few judges ever take its output — the ratios of decisions — seriously enough to be led
into serious error.
II. Remedying the Remedial mentality
A. Sources of Obligation, etc.
Common law doctrine and its study have undergone numerous momentous changes
over the past two hundred years. These changes have been influenced by a variety of
factors, some internal and some external to the law. A list of the obvious ones includes:
changes in the organization of legal education and changes in the organization of the
practice of law; developments in English legal philosophy and the ready incorporation
of some of these developments into private law doctrine; the influence of the civil law
and civilian thinking, especially in the law of obligations;18 and the Judicature Acts."
There is a cultural dimension to the developments — it is possible to speak of
American, English, Canadian and Australian traditions or patterns ofthinking. But there
are plenty of indications of trans-national influence and a growing recognition in most
jurisdictions that the value of a precedent is not solely a function of its source. In some
areas of private law theory, the arguments transcend national culture so that we have
"tort theory" and "tort theorists" and a "law of contract," with no explicit or implicit
adjectives that situate the subject studied in any particular legal culture. Much of this
trans-national common law, though, still shows its distinctive Anglo-American roots.20
The nature of these processes, their causes and sources are diverse. Many of the
developments will remain of exclusive interest to academic lawyers, with few
consequences for the practice of private law, others will not: judges now regularly cite
academic scholarship in Canada; the Restatements21 and the Uniform Commerical
Code were largely academic projects; and everyone has heard of Richard Posner and
the theory of efficient breach.
The law of restitution has remained, in large measure, impervious to the progressive
elements in these developments. Very few changes have occurred in the law of
restitution over the past two hundred years which are not capable of being accounted
for by the gradual evolution that one would normally expect from a precedent-based
system of law. Civil responsibility and contract, by contrast, have been at the centre of
the developments and have undergone enormous transformations. To explain why they
Gordlcy, ibid, at 34 IT.
Supreme Court ofJudicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), 36 & 37 Viet. c. 66. See also, Ihe Courts ofJustice
Act, R.S.O. 1984, c. II.
Nicely captured in the phrase "traditional splendid isolation" of Anglo-saxon legal science. Sec
J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
citing an Italian reviewer of a collection of essays for Tony Honorc, at xv.
Besides the Restatement of Restitution, supra note II, other influential Restatements include:
Restatement of the Law ofContracts (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1932), Restatement ofthe
Law (Second) of Torts, 2d ed. (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1965) and Restatement (Second)
ofAgency (1957).
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are further advanced one might begin by looking to developments in private law in the
nineteenth century, where borrowing from civil law writing aided in the development
of greater doctrinal integrity. This, in turn, led to the earlier achievement of consensus
on the structures of contract and civil responsibility and the possibility of scholarship
about their details, meaning, implications and legitimacy.22 It is probably also true that
these subjects are of much greater relevance to society generally in the sense that
contracts and the occasions of civil responsibility occur more frequently in society than
the occasions — whatever they may be — that give rise to a need for restitution. John
Dawson argued that the principle against unjust enrichment is always a latecomer in
legal systems.23 A test of the overall accuracy of the general thesis that contract is
further advanced than restitution might be the following: What argument is there in the
law of restitution that is at once as intuitively shocking and intellectually appealing as
the theory of efficient breach?24 That the theory of efficient breach shocks is a
measure of the strong appeal of the underlying moral principle that promises are to be
kept. It appeals to us, nonetheless, because the English tradition of private law has been
questioning the nature and justification of expectation damages for so long — since
"the Reliance Interest in Contract" — that a theory that seems to explain them so
elegantly has to be, at the least, of compelling interest. Restitution, by contrast, lacks
both a foundational moral principle and doctrinal structure stable enough to throw up
such a good basic issue. The fact that it names a legal response, in the same way that
"damages" or "injunctions" do, and that it is available as a remedial response in
contract, tort, Equity, and elsewhere, as well as in "restitution," is preciously
emblematic of this difficulty.
In the case of restitution, and related areas such as property law and some of Equity,
there is still a clear and distinct forms-of-action mentality. Almost all the modern
But even in these more advanced areas ofthe common law, there are sometimes failures to discern
structure. Three examples are sale, partnership and fiduciary duties. (1) On sale: As late as 1976
it was thought relevant and pertinent to make the following remarks on the relationship between
sale and contract: "In principle it is not easy to see why the law relating to contracts for the sale
of goods should be different from the law relating to the performance of other contractual
obligations.... Sale of goods law is but one branch of the general law of contract. It is desirable
that the same legal principles should apply to the law of contract as a whole and that different
legal principles should not apply to different branches of that law." Cehave N. V. v. Bremer
Handetsgeseltschaft m.b.H., [1976] I Q.B. 44 at 71 (C.A.), Roskill, L.J. See also the decision of
Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith Line Lid. v. Hansen-Tangen (The "Diana Prosperity"), [1976]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 621, 3 All E.R. 570 (H.L.). (2) On partnership: Contrast the clarity of the C.C.Q.
on partnership with obscurity of the partnership acts in the various common law provinces. In the
latter the foundational idea of mutual agency is barely recognizable. (3) On fiduciary duties: The
prevailing view is that the trust and other fiduciary duties are not sourccd in contract, but in
"equity." That view confuses the distinction between the source of an obligation (contract) and its
nature or essence (the obligation of loyalty) maintaining that the latter requires positing (Equity)
to be imperative. See, e.g., II.A.J. Ford & W.A. Lee, Principles ofthe Law of Trusts (Sydney: Law
Book Co., 1983) at 35-38 for a brief history of the "not-conlract" error.
Dawson, supra note 10 at 39-40.
See R. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1998). Or
the theory that the function of tort law is to reduce the cost of accidents, see G. Calabresi, The
Costs ofAccidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
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writers, despite their acceptance of the "principle" against unjust enrichment, accept it
to a significant extent.25 John Dawson likewise observed:
English law is riddled with distinctions, not only between law and equity, but between money and
goods and other types of interests, between jura in re and jura in personam, between money in bags
or stockings and money in bank accounts, lite old forms of action have greater influence now than
before their abolition in 1873. When one reads modern English discussions of the subject, one has the
sensation of being suddenly transported to the Middle Temple in 1603 to overhear some fresh debate
anSlade 'sCase*
The root cause of the problem is that there are few explicit foundational principles in
the common law and fewer still that are native to it. As a precedent-based normative
system, its dominant concept of systemic integrity is that like cases be treated alike.
Many of its internal organizing ideas are therefore, of necessity, based either on (1)
apparent commonalities within a selected group of cases — assumpsit, the common
counts, and restitution are pertinent examples in the present context or (2) historical
continuity, with Equity and the trust as pertinent examples in the present context. The
method is sometimes described as pragmatic, flexible, and conducive to certainty and
evolutionary development. Holmes' dictum that experience, not logic is the life of the
law is the motto.27 The main engine of explicit change within the system as a whole,
and within restitution in particular, is "policy" or "equity" in the face of "new
circumstances," often bolstered by overtly historicist arguments.28 Fictions and plain
This can he seen in the organization of some of the leading textbooks which still adopt, of
necessity (in order to state the law) the old forms of action classification of doctrines. Sec. e.g.,
L. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993)
[hereinafter Goff & Jones, 4th cd.|; and see P.D. Maddaugh & J.D. McCamus, The law of
Restitution (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1990) and A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution
(London: Buttenvorths, 1993). Sec also A. Burrows & E. McKendrick, Cases and Materials on
the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). A major exception is Birks,
Introduction, supra note IS.
Dawson, supra note 10 at 16.
A similar point is made by B.S. Markcsinis. "Judge, Jurist in the Study and Use of Foreign Law"
(1993) 109 L.Q. Rev. 622 at 623: "... the English judicial mind is at its best when handling,
defining and rc-defining complex case law rather than when it is forced into theorising system
building and deductive reasoning. For the English judge would, instinctively, feel much sympathy
for Goethe's words 'Grey, my dear friend, is all that theory is, and green the golden tree of life'
until, that is, he is reminded that these words are put into the mouth of Mcphistophclcs, at which
stage judicial caution may lead him to invoke the words of the more respectable Mr. Justice
Holmes ... when he claimed that the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience."
For example, late twentieth century common law writers often dismiss nineteenth century doctrine
for being classical liberal and individualistic and, as if it followed, therefore, closed to the
possibility of claims in unjust enrichment. One author — the caricature is so common one hesitates
to cite anyone in particular — has stated that "historically the common law's attitude towards one
who mistakenly provided non-monetary benefits to another ... was tight listed and fiercely
individualistic." See also Mel achlin J. in Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada. 11992| 3 S.C.R.
762, 98 D.L.R. (4lh) 140 thereinafter Peel\, and Dickson J. in Hydro Electric Commission of the
Township of Sepean v. Ontario Hydro, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 347, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193 [hereinafter
Nepean v. Ontario Hydro cited to S.C.R.]. This type of characterization is unfortunate because it
engenders the belief that all "old" law is tainted because of political ideology, rather than accepting
the more plausible hypothesis that doctrinal errors occurred then, as now, because of misguided
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ignorance in the face of impossible complexity are two engines of implicit change. But
there are few inward turns to the implicit form or logic at the foundations of the
thought. In a not too flattering sense, the common law is practical and pragmatic: it is
ad hoc or 'situationist.' Yes, it responds, often creatively and sensibly, to problems
when they arise and it has a rich armoury of "tools" to do the job. But the total
resulting product is as though a thousand well-equipped carpenters, without a plan and
whose only means of communication and coordination is the actual work they produce,
combined together to build a hotel.29 The impression is of a system that is rich in
ideas, methods and ways of organizing itself, but deficient in understanding. Although
this description is not true of contract and tort, it is true, depressingly so, of restitution.
What is needed in the law of restitution is a formal structure.
It is at this juncture that the civil law tradition is helpful. The civilian mentality is
rationalist. It consciously constructs and deploys structures of ideas — universal and
particular, principle and instantiation, substance (or essence) and attributes, rule and
application — systematically in the articulation of its rules. Civil codes are an obvious
product of this mentality; one can readily understand that such comprehensive
expressions of the principles of private law can only be achieved through a well-
structured articulation. "Obligation" is a general abstract idea, developed in detail
doctrinally by academic writers and in civil codes in a number of directions. First it is
defined and its form is identified.30 Then it is articulated horizontally by providing
analysis of its temporal and logical modalities, and the modes of its transfer, alteration,
performance and extinction. It is also articulated vertically, down through its various
sources, or efficient causes, in contract, civil responsibility, and unjust enrichment (and
others, including, importantly for present purposes, negotiorum gestio), and from there
down further to nominate contracts or nominate torts.31 Paradoxically, rationalism
proves more pragmatic than pragmatism because its emphasis on coherence tends to
guarantee economy of thought and of concepts, and because it is prudently
parsimonious in its deployment of logical and normative necessity. It thus leaves vast
room for contingencies and circumstances in application. The law, as a consequence,
can be stated in surprisingly few propositions.32
allegiance to unnecessary legal fictions and separate categories or rules (viz., quasi-conlract,
Restitution and Equity).
A more charitable explanation is given by F.H. Lawson when he commented the common law is
"less of a formal system of thought than a diffused wisdom derived from the collective tradition
of a profession and from long personal experience in the handling of legal problems." See F.H.
l,awson, The Rational Strength of English Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951) at 29.
Art. 1371 C.C.Q.: "It is of the essence of an obligation that there be persons between whom it
exists, a prcstalion which forms its object, and, in the case of an obligation arising out of a
juridical act [e.g., a contract), a cause which justifies its existence."
The C.C.Q. starts with Obligations in general (Arts. 1371-1372), then proceeds to define Contract
and Civil Responsibility (Art. 1377 ff. & I4S7) and then finally defines special rules for nominate
contracts such as sale, gift, lease, employment and mandate (see e.g., 1708-2643, 1806-1841, 1851-
2000, 2085-2097 & 2130-2185) and nominate cases of civil responsibility for children, animals
and buildings (sec eg, Arts. 1459, 1466 & 1467).
For example, general liability for fault is set out in An. 14S7 C.C.Q. which states: "Every person
has a duty to abide by the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances,
usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another." Similarly, Art. 1382 Code Civil [hereinafter
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Another range of ideas classifies the legislative participation in the articulation of
private law into rules of logically different types. The legislator may attempt to state
the essential characteristics or the real definition of an institution: the contract of sale,
for example, by stating that sale is translative of title." This type of rule is imperative
not because it is posited, but because it is, plain and simply, true. The legislator may
also state imperative rules declarative of some underlying public policy, or in civilian
terminology, "public order."34 Provisions "of public order" do not concern the form
of a legal institution, but rather their legitimate use and proper social and economic
content and operation. For example, contracts may not be used for purposes inimical
to the common good." A legislated rule may also be suppletive. If addressed to
private law actors, a suppletive rule is one that, in the absence of facts indicating an
explicit or implied contrary intention, will be taken as the actors' intention. In effect,
suppletive rules of this type are estimations by the legislator of what is typically
intended by people in a given range of circumstances. If addressed to an adjudicator,
a suppletive rule suggests a solution to a given range of cases ready-made for the
circumstances in the absence of facts indicating a contrary solution. It is an "off-the-
shelf application of a rule to a set of circumstances.
Another useful idea distinguishes between juridical facts and juridical acts.36
Obligations have their source (efficient cause) in one or the other. The first, juridical
fact, is a state of affairs to which the law attaches the legal consequence that an
obligation is owed, eg., fault causing loss raises an obligation of reparation. The
second, is an act manifesting the will of a private law actor, e.g., a promise or a will.
The classification of juridical acts and facts is a classification of fact situations, for
legal purposes, useful because it facilitates explication.
The concept of cause of action in the common law tradition identifies a related range
of ideas. A cause of action is a general argument for judicial intervention. One might
C. civ.), says "Tout fait quclconquc de I'homme, qui cause a autmi un dommage, oblige celui par
la faute duquel il csl arrivfi, a la reparer."
Thus, as Art. 1708 C.C.Q. slates: "Sale is a contract by which a person, the seller, transfers
ownership of property to another person, the buyer, for a price in money which the latter obligates
himself to pay." Therefore, the "essence" of the contract of sale is "title for price," and every
contract that is to be considered a contract of sale must instantiate this essence.
As Art 9 C.C.Q. states: "In the exercise of civil rights, derogations may be made from those rules
of this Code which supplement intention, but not from those of public order." See also, Art. 6 C.
Civ., which states: "On nc pcut derogcr, par des conventions particulieres, aux lois qui intiiressent
I'ordre public et les bonnes moeurs."
An example of a public order provision can be found in Art. 25 C.C.Q., which states: "The
alienation by a person of a part or product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repealed
ir it involves a risk to his health." Or Art. 1131 C. civ., which states: "L'obligation sans cause, ou
sur faussc cause, ou sur unc cause illicite, ne pcut avoir nucun effct."
Art. 1372 C.C.Q., defines the source of obligations as the following: "An obligation arises from
a contract or from any act or fact to which the effects of an obligation are attached by law." This,
however, is generally seen as an incomplete expression of all possible sources. See J.-L. Baudouin,
Les obligations, 4th cd. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1993) at 31-32. Therefore, this bipartite
classification ofjuridical act and juridical fact is the preferred solution in Quebec and in France.
See, e.g., Baudouin, ibid, at 31-33 and P. Malaurie & L. Aynes, Cours de Droit Civil, t. 2, 3d ed.
(Paris: Editions Cujos, 1994) at 75.
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think in terms of two main ones, civil responsibility and unjust enrichment, or three,
the third being breach of contract.37 Contract and civil responsibility were obvious
candidates for nineteenth century common lawyers. Promises and civil responsibility
have moral force and respond to time-honoured convictions about justice. IfX promises
to do something, X is obliged. If X is responsible for injury to his neighbour, X is
obliged."
These collectively are some of the foundational ideas in private law argument.39
Like the elementary models of the economist or public choice theorist, these ideas
constitute the simple normative reality on which complex and useful sciences of human
action are built.
Our task in this essay is not to identify or define all the possibilities of coherent
classification. Rather it is to use this way of thinking, and the main ideas mentioned —
obligation, imperative and suppletive rules, juridical fact and act, and causes of action
in civil responsibility, unjust enrichment and for breach of contract — in a critique of
restitution. Since the recourse is to mentality and key structural ideas, there is no
suggestion that any specific doctrinal solution reached by civilians is necessarily good
or right, nor is there any suggestion that the common law would benefit from
codification.40 Rather, the argument is that there is much to learn from this way of
reasoning."1
The reason for doubt here is that a breach ofcontract might more properly be considered as merely
an instance or civil responsibility. One might also divide civil responsibility further into its
constituent elements, such as intentional torts and negligence. The simple two-part classification,
however, makes considerable sense. If one thinks of the structure of private law argument, there
is, at the point of judicial intervention, a claimant (creditor) and a respondent (debtor). The
claimant's argument is either he has suffered some harm for which (he respondent is responsible
(due to fault, breach, or because it was caused by something or someone in the respondent's
control) or that the respondent has some thing or some value which he must return to the claimant.
As Lawson has argued: "(T]hc chief value of the study of the Civil Law for common lawyers is
to show the importance of clear cut concepts, to demonstrate ... how a well devised set of
principles and concepts can provide the elements for innumerable combinations, which fit almost
every conceivable state of facts." See F.H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, I9S3) S3 at 66 (hereinafter Common Lawyer].
For present purposes, it is not necessary to define how (lie causes of action relate to each other
initially, for example, whether they are mutually exclusive conceptually and/or in application. The
common law has taken steps in clarifying the relationship between contract and civil responsibility.
See Central Trust Co. v. Rafiise, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 481 and Henderson v.
Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1994] 3 All E.R. 506 (H.L.). The interrelation between unjust enrichment
and these two other fundamental cause of actions is still problematic. See the discussion of these
problems in Part III, infra. The civil law of Quebec delineates a theory of the proper spheres of
the three causes of action, creating a hierarchy of obligations, see Arts. 1458 & 1494 C.C.Q.,
which are interpreted as limiting a plaintiff to (I) her remedies in contract to the exclusion of civil
responsibility and (2) to her remedies in contract or civil responsibility before recourse can be had
to unjust enrichment.
A code is just a "philosophical system reduced to statutory form, coherent and rigorous."
Therefore, a code is not necessary for such a system to exist.
See e.g., J.H. Mcrryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of
Western Europe and Latin America, 2d ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985) at 2, where
he states that "A legal tradition, as the term applies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts,
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In restitution there are only particulars — contribution, recoupment, waiver of tort,
equitable acquiescence, equitable tracing, legal tracing, confidential information — and
only a nascent form, the "principle" against unjust enrichment. The task is to move
from this stifling reality to a more intelligible organization.
B. The Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment
The first step is to start with a definition of the cause of action in unjust enrichment.
The definition that is implicit in much of the English language writing on the subject
is this: the plaintiff argues that the defendant has received something of value from the
plaintiff unjustly and which the defendant should therefore return. "Unjust" means non-
consensual. There are only three ways a transfer can occur non-consensual ly: theft,
mistake and finding. The meaning of theft is clear. Only mistakes which show that a
relevant juridical act, either onerous or gratuitous, was not intended, are relevant.
Finding relates to situations where the defendant "finds" himself enriched at the
plaintiffs expense, but where there is no taking or theft on his part and no giving or
transfer on the part of the plaintiff. In each of these, the plaintiff argues for the return
of the value still retained. The justice of the plaintiffs argument is readily apparent:
"That's mine, give it back!" In a sense, John Dawson was mistaken — unjust
enrichment is among the first principles to emerge in a legal system since "novel
disseisin" and "detinue sur trover" are two of the oldest writs in the common law
system and they are, in essence, merely instantiations of the more general argument.
What arrives late, of course, is the abstraction and generalization to the cause of action
in unjust enrichment. The late arrival is possibly due to the fact that claims to vindicate
property rights and mistaken payment doctrines are generally adequate to address most
unjust enrichment claims in earlier societies with less sophisticated economies. Unjust
enrichment is, simply, the non-consensual transfer and retention of value, just as
contract is promise and breach of promise, and tort is fault.
The suggested definition rules out a number of arguments right at the outset. First,
the plaintiff must suffer a loss that corresponds to the defendant's gain and the plaintiff
can therefore never recover more than that loss by virtue of this argument. Therefore,
unjust enrichment is not about punishing.42 Second, it is not necessary to show any
blameworthincss or culpability in the defendant in order to establish the entitlement to
restitution. The defendant can be perfectly innocent as he is in the cases of finding and
corporations, and crimes, although such rules will almost always be in some sense a reflection or
that tradition. Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature
or law, about the role of law in the society and the polity about the proper organization and
operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected and taught." A traditional explanation of the differences between the two systems is
given by Lord Macmillan in "Two Manners of Thinking" in Introduction a t'hltude du Droil
compart!: Hecueil d"Etudes en I'honneur d'tdouard Lambert (Paris: Socidtd anonyinc du rccucil
Sirey, 1938). The common law is described as inductive, favouring casuistry, traditional, concrete,
procedural, empirical, formalistic, and preferring distinctions. The civil law is described as
deductive, general, rational, abstract, substantive, universal, anti-formalistic, and preferring
interpretation.
Although, in the appropriate circumstance the plaintiff may have an argument supporting a
punitive damage claim much as he/she would have under any other private law cause of action.
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mistaken payment. In other words, unjust enrichment is not about fault. Conversely,
however, if there is a theft there will be concurrent claims in tort and unjust
enrichment. Third, the defendant's will with respect to the circumstances under which
the receipt occurred is almost entirely irrelevant. It is not a necessary part of the
argument to show that the defendant asked for anything from the plaintiff or that the
defendant freely accepted anything from the plaintiff.41 In other words, the cause of
action in unjust enrichment is not about promising. Fourth, since the argument
establishes a right to the return of what the defendant still retains, the defendant cannot
be made to pay or return anything, by virtue of this argument, if she is no longer
enriched. If she still has a portion of the value, she cannot be made to pay more than
she has. Therefore, the change of position defense is central to unjust enrichment.44
Concomitantly, the unjust enrichment claim, like the simple property claim, entails, by
virtue of the retention element, a bankruptcy priority, since the trustee in bankruptcy
retains what the defendant retained on the eve of bankruptcy. Formulated as a cause of
action, unjust enrichment provides a complete argument justifying a coercive
intervention into the affairs of the defendant to reverse an enrichment.
Under this definition, unjust enrichment is merely a generalization of the ideas
underlying a simple property claim. The key elements of both are the fact that the
plaintiff does not agree to the defendant's receiving an enrichment from him and that
the defendant still retains the enrichment. To transfer title or the entitlement to an
enrichment, the transferor must intend to transfer the right. That intention is missing
only in the circumstances of mistake, theft and finding.45
An alternative definition of unjust enrichment regards the simple property claim as
logically or substantivcly distinct, not as an instance. There are two arguments that can
be advanced in support of this view, but first, it needs to be said that the distinction
does not and cannot lie in a supposed right of an owner to get his property back, since
in modem private law systems he has no such right. Whether he gets it back is a matter
for the court's discretion exercised mainly on the basis that returning the property is the
most efficacious manner, under the circumstances, to effect justice. The two plausible
points of distinction are: (1) It is not permissible to defend against a simple property
claim to say the defendant gave good consideration innocently in exchange to a third
party to obtain possession of the plaintiff s property (there is no bonafide purchaser for
value defence); and, (2) It is not permissible for a defendant to a simple property claim
The Tact the plaintiff did request or freely accept may be relevant on the question whether the
receipt was of any benefit to him/her.
Sec Art. 1495 C.C.Q., which states: "An indemnity is due only if the enrichment continues to exist
on the day of the demand." But see, I.ipkin Gorman v. Karpnalc Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.)
[hereinafter Lipkin Gorman] where it is argued that the change of position defense is purely
discretionary.
Duress and other sorts of compulsion short of theft do not vitiate transfers in the same sense as
these because in cases of duress and compulsion the owner does indeed intend, however
reluctantly, the relevant juridical act. Such an owner may seek the court's intervention, but the
basis of that intervention is not unjust enrichment. It is tort. The characteristic remedy for the
compulsion claim is to unwind the faulty transaction. That remedy is the most efficacious way to
repair the harm caused.
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to argue a change of position as a result of some expenditure subsequent to receipt if
in fact he still retains the plaintiffs property. Since these two prohibited arguments are
generally available to unjust enrichment defendants, it could be that the categories
unjust enrichment and property do not relate as general principle and instance.
Alternatively, and in our view preferably, when a plaintiff asserts that the defendant
may not make either of the two arguments, the plaintiffs assertion can be seen and
should be seen as the (peculiar) doctrinal content, in the context of nonconsensual
transfers of material objects, of the retention requirement of the unjust enrichment
claim.
Although an interesting question, no attempt to resolve the nature of the simple
property claim will be made here since it does not make a great deal of difference for
the remaining arguments in the essay which hypothesis is chosen. It might be said of
the first view, in passing and in closing (and perhaps unfairly), that it is additionally
objectionable for the extrinsic reason that it is the legal manifestation of the equally
objectionable moral and political ideology of possessive individualism. Possessive
individualism regards the person as somehow in the things that he owns, as opposed
to merely relating to others through the medium of things. It is an ontologically
extravagant and probably false understanding of the idea of freedom.
HI. doctrinal Barriers
There are many doctrinal barriers impeding the emergence of a cause of action in
unjust enrichment in the common law and therefore, there is more than one thing wrong
with the law of restitution. We illustrate this claim by breaking it down into the
following problems: (a) The inherent expansiveness of "restitution" and "unjust
enrichment" if these terms, especially the latter, are not rigorously defined; (b) The lack
of serious competition for the expansive versions of the subject, on a number of fronts;
(c) The lack of a clear direction in the effort to reform of the law of quasi-contract and
the constructive trust; (d) The deeply embedded nature of some of the quasi-contract
thinking; Poor analysis in some areas of the law of (e) contract and (0 tort; and, (g)
The lack of an explicit, internal mechanism of structural reform in the common law
tradition. There is no cumulative progression in the analysis through these seven points.
Each could stand on its own. Some of the later arguments, however, assume assent to
some of the earlier, generally simpler claims.
A. INHERENT EXPANSIVENESS OF A POORLY FORMULATED PRINCIPLE
The status and meaning of "unjust enrichment" in English law is not clear. This lack
of clarity has been exploited in recent years, in at least three ways, to expand its
applicability far beyond its proper domain.
(1) Most courts and modern writers do not identify unjust enrichment as a cause of
action. Instead, they appeal to the vague "principle" that "restitution is based on unjust
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enrichment."46 Those who identify it as a "principle" do not typically define the
meaning or role of "principles" in private law argument: What is a principle? What
other principles are there of equivalent significance to unjust enrichment? When is it
appropriate in private law argument to appeal to principles? If definitive answers to
these types of question are not provided, the normative power of "unjust enrichment"
becomes purely a function of the will of the speaker. On the "progressive" extreme, it
will be treated as the foundation of all or much of private law. Due to its very close
relationship with the concept of property and the centrality of that concept to all private
law argument, it can, in a sense, be seen to operate everywhere in private law.47 As
with the principle that promises are to be kept and the principle that one person should
not harm the person or property of another, all, or almost all, of private law could with
some plausibility, be made to look like applications of the principle of unjust
enrichment: failure by one contracting party to reciprocate the performance of the other
looks like unjust enrichment, as does the failure of the tortfeasor to pay compensation.
On the "orthodox" extreme, it will be discarded as far too vague to be of any use at all
in private law argument.
The tendency in English law down to the 1970s was to take the orthodox view. This
doctrinal orthodoxy, most would now acknowledge, led to impossible confusion in the
law of quasi-contract and constructive trusts. Since the 1970s, the progressive view has
gained ascendancy. Now, there are law school courses and many texts on the law of
restitution based on the principle against unjust enrichment. The danger of the
progressive view is that it is inherently expansionist, by leaving the term "principle"
unspecified.
(2) Logically, however, the progressive version must ultimately incorporate the
principle into private law argument as a cause of action. Logically, the progressive view
must be that the principle's normative role is as a general argument that fully justifies
the use of coercive force by the state against the defendant. The progressive view
cannot execute on its responsibility to make this position clear because it does not have,
in the common law tradition, the full range of normative terminology to explicate the
principle as a cause of action. Although the tradition does have the idea of cause of
action, it is otherwise too empirical in its epistemology to identify clearly the normative
structures at work in private law argument. This empirical mentality, clothed as a
modern or enlightened view, is a second element in the expansive tendency of "unjust
enrichment." Under the guise of a liberator from orthodoxy, and thus appealing to
reform instincts in all of us, it blusters into unclaimed doctrinal territory after unclaimed
territory, claiming each as its own, oblivious to deeper juridical realities. In the process
Quote taken from S. Hedley, "Unjust Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution — An Overworked
Concept" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56 at 56. For a general articulation of this belief, see Maddaugh
& McCamus, supra note 25 at 31-64, Burrows & McKcndrick, supra note 25 at I, Burrows, supra
note 25 at 1-6, L. Goff & G. Jones, 4th cd., supra note 25 at 1-16, and Birks, Introduction, supra
note 15 at 16-22.
This is one of the attacks made by S. Hedley in attempting to show why unjust enrichment is not
the only explanation of the law of Restitution. He argued, following Professor Atiyah "that unjust
enrichment exerts influence over many branches of the law, while providing the complete
explanation of none." See S. Hedley, ibid, at 58-59. See also Atiyah, supra note 4 at 768.
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it invents concepts — more fictions — to subdue the conquered territory so that it
plausibly conforms to the logic of the cause of action in unjust enrichment.
(3) The principal mechanism of the imperialistic advance is the failure of the
progressive view to define "unjust." Instead of defining unjust, the progressive view
merely identifies or lists "unjust factors." The longest list of these is in Andrew
Burrows' and Ewan McKendrick's book Cases and Materials on the Law of
Restitution.** According to this source, the "unjust factors" are: mistake, ignorance,
duress, exploitation, legal compulsion, illegitimate pressure, undue influence, necessity,
failure of consideration, illegality, incapacity, ultra vires demands by public authorities,
and retention of the plaintiffs property without his consent. Other authors would add
free acceptance to this list.49 These factors are operative in the law of contract and
civil responsibility as well as the law of unjust enrichment. For most of them there is
some controversy over how they operate to justify a claim for relief. This is a perennial
problem in private law scholarship. The current common law, as one might expect, is
rather ad hoc and haphazard in its work in this area. There is no common terminology
and it is readily accepted that each of these may operate differently in different
doctrinal contexts.30
Variations in logic and content across the categories of private law, although a
serious problem, is not the main difficulty. Many of these factors, no matter what their
proper content, do not belong in unjust enrichment. In the cause of action in unjust
enrichment the only "unjust factors" (we say) are mistake, taking and finding51
because these are the only instances where the enrichment is non-consensual. "Unjust,"
in this view of the subject, is defined as "without juristic reason." The progressive view
of "unjust" is to leave it undefined. Since all of private law is about justice, all of
private law (it says) belongs to unjust enrichment. Anything can be, and in fact has
been, added to the subject.
The irony in all this is that we regard ourselves as moving the law to a higher plain
of intelligibility by collecting all of this doctrine into one new category — unjust
enrichment or restitution — but in fact all we are doing is arranging old doctrines in
a new way. It is no better, intellectually speaking, than an alphabetical order, or for that
matter, Bulten and Leake." The progressive view does not seek to escape its empirical
mentality, even if it feels better about itself for having liberated the law from one
system of unintelligible organization only to imprison it in another. In the meantime,
Supra note 25 at 91.
Cioff & Jones, 4th cd., supra nole 25 18 (T. Sec also P. Birks, "In Defence of Free Acceptance"
in A.S. Burrows, cd., Essays on the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 105.
On duress and compulsion as vitiating factors, sec J.C. Bcalson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust
Enrichment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 113-17; P. Atiyah, "Economic Duress and the
'Overborne Will'" (1982) 98 L.Q. Rev. 197 nnd P. Birks, "The Travails of Duress" (1990) 3
Lloyd's Mar. & Comm. L.Q. 342.
For a fuller development of this argument see D. Stevens "Knowing Assistance and Knowing
Receipt in the Supreme Court of Canada" (forthcoming, U.F.L.R.).
E. Bullcn & S.M. I .cake, Precedents of Pleadings in Personal Actions in the Superior Courts of
Common Law, 3d cd. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1868).
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and this is a second irony, the development or emergence of the cause of action in
unjust enrichment is frustrated by the imperialism of the principle against "unjust"
enrichment, and the law becomes, like its orthodox predecessor, more and more
confusing.
B. WEAK COMPETITION
This expansive tendency is not adequately resisted by other areas of private law. The
reason a claim to include a doctrine under the banner of unjust enrichment might seem
plausible or persuasive, is that alternative candidates are not up to the competition.
There are several instances of this problem.
(I) One particularly injurious doctrinal tendency is to formulate the definition of
restitution or unjust enrichment so that the subject captured by these terms includes
those victimizations of the defendant that result in a gain by the defendant that does not
correspond to any patrimonial loss in the plaintiff." An example is the duty of a
trustee to account for the profits made in breach of the trust even though the breach did
not result in any loss to the plaintiff. This convergence of radically different types of
argument under the same rubric is unfortunate. In many of the cases where these types
of enrichments are forced to be given up, the intervention is clearly a punitive measure
justified out of a need to protect a special class of legal relationship.54 There is no point
confusing things by calling it unjust enrichment. The private law of punitive
interventions requires greater integrity.
An example or 111 is wide dcfinilion of restitution can be seen in the following observations: "(lie
law of restitution is sharply divided as between restitution for wrongs and autonomous unjust
enrichment. Restitution for wrongs is a remedial inquiry about the availability of reslilutionary (i.e.
gain-based) damages for wrongs. This part of the law of restitution can equally be considered to
be pan of the law of wrongs and part of the law of remedies. However, autonomous unjust
enrichment is a study of causes of action in unjust enrichment. The word 'autonomous' is put in
to make it cleat dial here the cause of action arises, not in the law of wrongs (torts, breaches of
contract, breaches of equitable or statutory duty, but in the independent category of unjust
enrichment" I*. Hirks & R. Chambers, "The Restitution Research Resource 1994" (1994) R.L.R.
Supp. at vi-vii.
Sec e.g., Boardman v. Phippr, (1966), |I967] 2 A.C. 46, (1966] 3 All F..R. 721 (H.l.) (plaintiffs
allowed to recover profits that trustee obtained through an innocent breach of trust); Reading v.
A.-G., [1951] A.C. 507, I All E.R. 617 (H.L.) (crown permitted to retain "profits" made by
disloyal officer who escorted contraband through Cairo streets in full uniform); A.-G. for Hong
Kong v. Reid, [I994J 1 A.C. 324 (P.C.) (government given proprietary interest in three properties
purchased by defendant with bribes obtained in breach of his duty as public prosecutor); Snepp
v. United Stales, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980), rehearing den. 445 U.S. 972, 100 S. Cl.
1668 (1980) (in breach of a contract that required prcpublication review, a CIA agent was found
to hold the profits from sale of book as a constructive trustee). Canadian courts have become more
likely to explicitly recognize die punitive aspects involved in certain areas of traditional restitution.
For example, sec llodgkinson v. Simms, (1994) 3 S.C.R. 377, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 453
Iliercinallcr llodgkinson cited to S.C.R.] where La Forest J. states: "The law of fiduciary duties
has always contained within it an clement of deterrence.... In this way the law is able to monitor
a given relationship society views as socially useful...." (Cited with approval in Soulos v.
Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 SCR 217, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 214, McLachlin J.).
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(2) Another harmful tendency is the inclusion in the law of unjust enrichment of that
body of doctrine dealing with the division of assets after the dissolution of a
matrimonial or quasi-matrimonial union." It is a mistake to include these cases within
the cause of action of unjust enrichment. Marriage is a unique institution instantiating
a distinctive human good and range of values. It requires its own legal logic. Certainly,
whatever legal terms are developed for matrimonial relationships will bear affinities to
other areas of private law. The marriage vow is like a contract and the marriage
relationship is like a partnership. However, treating it in exactly the same terms as
economic relations is degrading for it and confusing for private law. The private law
governing marriage and the family requires greater integrity.
(3) The cause of action in unjust enrichment is also over-expanded by the temptation
of the courts to resort to it where sounder resolutions are precluded or seem to be
precluded by other rules. Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada56 is a
straightforward example of the problem. It is also an instructive one because it is the
case in Canada which first recognized a cause of action in unjust enrichment. There the
court accepted that the aunt had indeed made a promise to the nephew, but held that
the promise was unenforceable by virtue of the Ontario Statute of Frauds." The
nephew recovered in any event. The court said the reason was the principle of unjust
enrichment, yet the moral and legal force of the nephew's argument rested entirely on
her promise to pay. Had she not promised, he would not have recovered. The decision
is better and more clearly justified as a case of relief in contract, based on that promise.
The statute's sanction of"unenforceability" need not have been interpreted as requiring
that the promise be completely ignored, only that it not be fully enforced. The
restriction of the nephew's recovery to his reliance loss, and not his expectation loss,
could have been justified as the effect of the statute on the contract. Instead, and
unfortunately, unjust enrichment was called in aid, to the detriment of both it and
contract law.
The Deglman phenomenon is a problem of what might be called "vitiated" or,
perhaps more tellingly, "bastard" doctrine — a doctrine whose true "parent" is forced,
for the sake of appearances, to remain anonymous. The court in Deglman was faced
with what it considered to be a rule of unimpeachable and unquestionable authority.
After all, it was enacted four centuries ago! That rule seemed to preclude a just
resolution to the case. Instead of confronting that rule directly, however, the court by
passed it with an invention. Appearances were saved, but the doctrine created was
vitiated.
Restitution is full of such doctrines. In Sinclair v. Brougham,™ the deposit contracts
were void for being ultra vires the building society, yet the building society had been
Although harmful, this inclusion is understandable given the fact that these types of cases have
been the most influential in the development of the Canadian version of the unjust enrichment
principle. See, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker, (1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 O.L.R (3d) 257 [hereinafter
Petlkus] and Sorochan v. Sorockan, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter Sorockan].
[1954] S.C.R. 725, 3 D.L.R. 785. [hereinafter Deglman].
The Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-19 [hereinafter Statute of Frauds].
[1914] A.C. 398 (H.L.) [hereinafter Sinclair v. Brougham].
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in the business of banking for forty years. In Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd.*9 the
contract was void because the board of directors of the defendant company had not
been properly constituted at the date the contract was entered into, yet the plaintiff did
the work that the corporation required to be done. In Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd. v.
Paul,60 (as in Deglman), the contract was not enforceable because of a failure to
comply with a statutory writing requirement, yet the plaintiff had done all the work
expected under the contract. In Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building
Society1 the mortgage entered by the infant was void, yet the money was advanced
under the loan contract. In all these cases there was no doubt whatsoever that the
underlying relationships were contractual. However, in all of them, a statutory rule said,
or seemed to say, that the contract was not real. The judicial effort was to escape from
contract to another basis of liability. In the process, many vitiated doctrines were
created: unjust enrichment got off to a bad start in Deglman; tracing in equity was
corrupted in Sinclair v. Brougham; subrogation was corrupted in Thurston; and modem
writers have invented doctrines such as free acceptance, total failure of consideration,
and incontrovertible benefit to make the invented solutions conform in some plausible
manner to the logic of unjust enrichment. The alternative was, and is, to develop
doctrines that address the problem of clumsy statutory sanctions directly. The sanctions
should usually be read as a direction that the court is not necessarily bound to apply
all of the terms of the contract. In sorting out the relationship between the parties. In
the appropriate case, the court should impose a solution that conforms in part with the
terms of the contract, and in part with specified fairness criteria based on the goals of
the statute and common sense.62 The resort to vitiated doctrines comes at great cost.
It promotes confusion. The new concepts that have to be invented to achieve the
artificial results limit the ability of subsequent jurists to define a proper conception of
unjust enrichment. The private law governing clumsy legislative interventions requires
greater integrity.
(4) The common law has a weak and deficient theory of sources of obligation since
no court has ever been, nor ever will be, seized of the question. Its theory is deficient
because in the prevailing, largely implicit, view, there are only three sources of
obligation: contract, tort, and unjust enrichment. As in the case of vitiated doctrines, if
for some reason contract and tort are not available to explain an inherited doctrine,
there is a temptation to make it fit into unjust enrichment as a sort of default category.
As civilian experience shows, there is no prima facie reason why the sources should
be restricted to these three.
An example of a doctrine that is difficult to classify in any of the three is the
doctrine of "necessitous intervention." The common law currently provides a remedy
[1936] 2 K.B. 403 (C.A.) [hereinafter Craven-Ellis].
(1987), 162 C.L.R. 221 (II.C. of A.) [hereinafter Pavey].
(1902) I Ch. I (C.A.) [hereinafter Thurstan].
See, e.g.. Art. 1437 C.C.Q, which provides that "An abusive clause in a consumer contract or
contract of adhesion is null, or the obligation arising from it may be reduced." A contract of
adhesion is defined in Art. 279 C.C.Q. as "a contract in which the essential stipulations were
imposed or drawn up by one of the parties, on his behalf or upon his instructions, and were not
negotiable."
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to the doctor who attempts to save the life of an unconscious suicide.63 Clearly not
contract or tort, the obligation to pay the doctor for his services must therefore, it is
currently thought, be unjust enrichment. "Necessity," in this view of the doctrine, is
called into play the role of "unjust factor," but its relevance as such is, frankly, difficult
to understand. What does the fact that the service was necessary and provided in an
emergency have in common with the other unjust factors? In mistake, theft and finding,
there is a total absence of any intention to transfer a right, yet in the case of necessity,
the doctor clearly does intend to help the suicide. Here, the vagueness of the unjust
enrichment principle is called in aid and the juridical challenge of defining fundamental
terms ignored.
The alternative is to regard the doctrine as sui generis, as belonging to a different
category of argument altogether. The negoliorum gestio doctrine in the civil law
tradition bears some affinity to the common law doctrine of necessitous intervention.
Importantly, for present purposes, it is typically positioned as being a source unto itself.
It is not difficult to see why since the doctrine does so much private law work at once.
It simultaneously solves the authority, immunity and indemnity issues arising in the
context of certain voluntary interventions of one person into the affairs of another.64
The obligation of the owner to indemnify the geslor that arises under this doctrine is
definitely not contractual or delictual in nature, but it is not positioned as unjust
enrichment either. It is negotiorum gestio. One very plausible, deeper explanation for
the owner's obligation to indemnify is the virtue of gratitude: if the gestofs intervention
meets the stringent conditions established in conventional formulations of the doctrine,
very clearly the owner ought to be grateful for the intervention and graciously pick up
the tab. The court's order tells the defendant to do the decent thing. If the common law
were to look at it that way it might begin to see the logic of necessity, not as an "unjust
factor," whatever that may mean, but as an indication of an occasion for gratitude.
Moreover, with the significance of the doctrine thus revealed, the criterion itself could
widen beyond necessitous circumstances to something like opportune circumstances,
and widen further still to place obligations on the gestor that the affair be managed
well, both as a civil responsibility and a condition of gratitude.65 The private law
theory of sources of obligation requires greater integrity.
There is no general theory of obligations in the common law and no current
inclination or agency to develop one. Hence, all that part of the law of obligations
Malheson v. Smiley, [19321 2 D.L.R. 787, 1 W.W.R. 758.
See Arts. 1482-1490 C.C.Q., and Arts. 1372-1374 C. civ.
See Art 1482 C.C.Q., which states: "Management of the business of another exists where a
person, the manager, spontaneously and under no obligation to act, voluntarily and opportunely
undertakes to manage the business of another, the principal, without his knowledge, or with his
knowledge if he was unable to appoint a mandatary or otherwise provide for it." For an apparently
(but not really) related group of cases — agency of necessity — explicable on the basis of implicit
contract, see China Pacific S.A. v. Food Corporation of India, (The Winson) (1981), [1982] AC.
939, [1981] 3 All E.R. 688 (C.A.); Tetley v. British Trade Corporation (1922), 10 LI. L.R. 678;
Poland v. John Parr & Sons (1926), [1927] I K.B. 236, [1926] All E.R. Rep 177 (C.A.); and Firm
o/Gokal Chand-Jagan Math v. Firm ofNand Ram Das-Alma Ram, [1939] A.C. 106, (1939-1940)
3 M.L.R. 272 (P.C.).
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dealing with modalities, transfer, performance and extinction is without intelligible
organization, or hope of acquiring one. Instead, it is reasoned, if the doctrine is not
obviously about contract or tort, it must be unjust enrichment.
The doctrine of recoupment provides a useful example. Recoupment allows the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant an amount paid to another that benefited the
defendant. Currently, it is thought to be available on the basis of unjust enrichment. The
doctrine is conventionally stated in the form of a four-part rule: (I) there must have
been some legal compulsion operating on the plaintiff at the time of payment; (2) the
plaintiff cannot have exposed himself or herself to the compulsion officiously; (3) the
plaintiffs payment must have discharged an obligation owed by the defendant; and, (4)
as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was primarily liable on the
obligation.66 The central case of its applicability is in the law of suretyship.67 The
central doctrinal question is the nature of the surety's right to recover from the principal
debtor. The conventional view argues unjust enrichment as the solution, with legal
compulsion playing the role of "unjust factor." But, of course, it makes no sense to say
that the fact that the surety is legally compelled to pay is a ground for making anyone
else pay. The compulsion here is not like the duress exerted on the reluctant bargainer
because the force applied against the surety is entirely legal. The two cases of
compulsion bear no legal resemblance: one is illegal and therefore a tort, and the other
is perfectly legal.
The better argument is that the whole operation is happening over in the law of
contract and in the part of the general theory that deals with the transfer of obligations.
The common law is missing a clear concept of transfer of obligations by "subrogation."
Additionally, in this example, it is missing a notion of nominate contracts as well as
an understanding of the nominate contract of suretyship. The surety recovers from the
debtor either because the debtor promised to indemnify him or because the creditor is
obliged by the contract of suretyship to transfer the principal claim. The subrogation
that occurs in this latter instance has nothing to do with unjust enrichment.
The inability of the common law to correctly identify the basis of the surety's claim
against the principal led to a serious error in the very famous English decision oWwen
v. Tale.™ In that case, the court held that a surety who voluntarily entered into the
See Own v. Tale, [1976] I Q.B. 402 (C.A.) at 407, Scarman, LJ. [hereinafter Oitcn] for an
influential formulation. Montgomery J. in the Ontario High Court decision in Peel (Regional
Municipality) v. Ontario (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 759,64 O.R. (2d) 298 (H.CJ.) altered the second
condition by requiring the payment not be made foolishly, as opposed to requiring that the
exposure to liability not be made officiously. For thorough discussions of recoupment, sec
Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 25 at c. 29 and GofT& Jones, 4lh cd., supra note 25 at c. 12-
14.
We do not follow through with a demonstration that similar misunderstandings lie behind the other
applications of the doctrine of recoupment (and of subrogation), but this could be done for most
of the applications except, perhaps, Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308, 3 Ksp. 8 and Brooks
Wharfand Bull Wharf, Ltd. v. Goodman Bros., [1937] I K.B. 534, 106 L.J.K.B. 437 (C.A). But
since these are anomalous cases, they should not be permitted to distort the analysis of the central
cases of suretyship.
Owen, supra note 66.
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obligation to guarantee a debt of the principal debtor could not, once he had paid that
debt, recover it from the principal debtor because there was no compulsion. The surety
was without remedy because he had voluntarily undertaken the obligation to guarantee
the debt. One writer explains the decision approvingly in the following terms:
Elements A and B [of the recoupment test, namely that there has been compulsion and that the plaintiff
did not officiously expose himself to the compulsion] can be seen to go to whether the enrichment is
reversible.... The main ground for reversibility is compulsion. Moreover, as in other contexts, recovery
may be denied where the plaintiff acted officiously; to discourage the imposition of unwanted
liabilities, the law will not consider an enrichment to be reversible if it was conferred officiously. To
put it another way, the officious plaintiff can hardly rely on compulsion as making the enrichment
reversible; no one is compelled to be officious/'9
What is overlooked in this passage — which is representative of the usual explanation
— is that the surety's claim against the principal debtor arises out of the implicit
assignment of that debt from the creditor to the surety. That assignment occurs when
the surety pays the money due on the indemnity. The creditor is obliged to convey the
debt because it is of the "essence" of the contract of suretyship that he do so.70
Phrased differently, if the creditor were to retain title to the debt of the principal debtor
as well as receive the indemnity, that creditor would be over-indemnified because she
would own not only the benefit of the actual performance of the promise to indemnify,
but also the debt. Since the surety is obliged only to indemnify the principal creditor,
it is immaterial how the surety undertook the obligation to guarantee the debt. What
matters is the nature of the contract of indemnity and the obligation of the creditor to
assign the debt to the surety once the surety pays. Unjust enrichment is irrelevant. The
law stating the general theory of obligations requires greater integrity.
C. The Lack of Clear Direction for Reform
An example that illustrates the disastrous state of English law in this area and one
that sets the pattern of the arguments in this section is the long and tedious history of
the "mistake of law" rule. That history began with an error made in 1815 with the
formulation of the rule in Bilbie v. Lumley.11 It continued through a century and a half
of convoluted exceptions, circumventions and fictions to avoid the rule, and concluded
with its final rejection by a series of decisions or statutes all over the
Commonwealth.72 The private and governmental time, energy and resources (judicial,
L.D. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
See Arts. 2333 & 2336 C.C.Q. See also, Art. 2356 C.C.Q., which states: "A surety who has bound
himself without the consent of the debtor may only recover from him what the debtor would have
been bound to pay, including damages, if there had been no suretyship...."
(1802), 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448.
See, e.g., New Zealand Judicature Amendment Act, 19S8, s. 94A; Air Canada v. British Columbia
(1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161. [1989] 4 W.W.R. 97 (S.C.C.); David Securities Ply. Ltd. v.
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992), 175 C.L.R. 353 (H.C. Aust.) [hereinafter David
Securities); and Willis Faber Enthoven (Ply.) Ltd. v. Receiver of Revenue, [1992] 4 S.A. 202.
However, "some commentators have postulated that the very tenacity of the [mistake of law] rule
is sufficient proof of its reasonableness." See Nepean v. Ontario Hydro, supra note 28 at 359,
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law reform commissions,73 university) that were spent in dealing with the Bilbie v.
Lumley1* error is scandalous. That history is as good an indication, as any, that the
doctrines in this area of law are corrupt. The problem for illustration in this part is that
even if we sense that this is true, the common law lacks a strategy to get out of the
difficulties, so it flounders about from ad hoc solution to ad hoc solution.
In each of the following four examples the law moves from one mistaken
formulation to another. Often the new formulation is more seriously mistaken than the
old. Always the move from old to new is justified explicitly as reform-minded, on the
express basis that the older formulation is deficient. The innovator, however, fails to
recognize that the innovation he proposes is equally or more seriously flawed, often in
exactly the same way. Liberation thus results in a new captivity, but the new captivity
is worse not only because the mistake is sometimes more serious, but more importantly
because the mistake is understood as a liberal or progressive move. As long as the new
captivity is felt as liberation, its pernicious effect cannot be recognized. Scrutton L.J.'s
famous remarks in Holt v. Markham1* illustrate the pattern of the error, its reform-
minded mentality, and its ultimate cause:
[T]hc whole history of this particular form of action has been what I may call a history of well
meaning sloppiness thought I do not propose to repeat the very pungent criticisms which Lord Sumner
has made upon that now discarded doctrine of Lord Mansfield in Baylis v. The Bishop ofLondon or
in Sinclair v. Brougham, but I respectfully entirely agree with what he says in the former case: "To
ask what course would be ex aequo et bono to both sides never was a very precise guide, and as a
working rule it has long since been buried.... Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are
not now free in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes
attractively styled 'justice as between man and man.'"7''
Here, in the name of clarity of thought and legal certainty, Scrutton L.J. rightly
criticizes intuitive justice, but he then goes on to embrace and entrench the quasi-
contract fiction which was, and continues to be, the source of as much harm to the legal
values of clarity and certainty as the intuitive justice he quite properly denigrated.
The cause of the mistake is the lack of a clear and defensible definition of the cause
of action in unjust enrichment. The pattern is exhibited in the following four cases. In
a way, of course, this is the error of the law of restitution as a whole: common lawyers
Dickson, i.
The English Law Commission, Consultation Paper, No. 120, Restitution ofPayments Made Under
a Mistake of Law (1991) discusses thoroughly, and makes recommendations with respect to,
recovery of payments made under mistaken law. See also, Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia, "Report on Benefits Conferred under a Mistake of Law" (Victoria: Province of British
Columbia, 1981); Law Reform Commission of South Australia, "Report Relating to the
Recoverability of Benefits Obtained by Reason of Mistake ofLaw" (1984); and New South Wales
Law Reform Commission, "Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Mistake of Law" (Sydney:
The Commission, 1987).
Supra note 71.
|I922] All E.R. 134, [1923] 1 KB. 504 (C.A.) [hereinafter Holt v. Markham cited to K.B.].
/*/</. at 513.
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have abandoned Lord Scrutton's false paradigm, quasi-contract, only to adopt another,
restitution. This is thought to be a progressive development but in fact it is more of the
same: both name a remedy when what is required is the definition of a right.
(1) The first example is the early twentieth century case, Sinclair v. Brougham,11
together with the reception that case received and continues to receive in contemporary
thinking on equitable tracing. A building society carried on a ultra vires banking
business for more than forty years. When the building society was ordered to be wound
up, the question arose as to which group of claimants, the outside creditors, the
unadvanced shareholders, or the depositors, would have priority to the assets of the
building society. The decision is famous for its refusal to recognize a cause of action
in unjust enrichment in the common law. As Viscount Haldane stated on this point:
|T]hc Common law of England really recognizes (unlike the Roman law) only actions of two classes,
those founded on contract and those founded on tort. When it speaks of actions arising quasi ex
contractu, it refers merely to a class of action in theory based on a contract which is imputed to the
defendant by a fiction of law. The fiction can only be set up with effect if such a contract would be
valid if it really existed."
On that basis, the court concluded that to find a quasi-contract it was necessary that
a real contract be possible on the facts. Since a real contract was impossible, the
depositors' personal claim in quasi-contract to recover the deposits was refused.
However, Viscount Haldane went on to hold that the depositors were entitled to the
assets of the building society remaining after the payment of the outside creditors, these
to be shared on a pro rata basis with the unadvanced shareholders. Viscount Haldane,
explaining the application of a proprietary remedy, said the money "never really ceased
to be theirs" and that it continued to belong "to them in equity."79 The building
society, while prohibited from being a debtor in contract and quasi-contract, was in this
phase of the argument transformed by virtue of the operation of these equitable
doctrines into a fiduciary. Yet, remarkably, here is the same fiction — a legally binding
"consensual" relationship imposed by law — that is set aside as not available in the
first half of Viscount Haldane's decision. The result, as well as the reasoning, is odd:
had the contracts with the depositors been valid, they would have ranked ahead of the
unadvanced shareholders and equally with the creditors, yet the presumably stronger
proprietary claim which forms the basis of the decision results in their ranking after the
creditors.
Today, no one doubts that the point made by Viscount Haldane in the first quoted
passage is false in at least two respects: (I) there are claims in unjust enrichment at
common law; and (2) since the contractual nature of the action quasi ex contractu is a
Supra note 58.
Ibid, at 415. Similarly, as late as 1978, Lord Diplock stated: "My Lords, there is no general
doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it docs is to provide specific
remedies in particular cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that
is based upon the civil law." Orakpo v. Maruon Investments Ltd., [I978| A.C. 95, |I977| 3 All
E.R. I (H.L.) at 7, Diplock LJ. (hereinafter Orakpo].
Supra note 58 at 415-16.
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fiction, it is not constrained by the restriction he imposed on it.80 While modern
writers recognize that the decision was in error in this way, the decision still stands as
authority on the doctrine of equitable tracing.81 Thus, even as the modern law is
liberated from the fiction of quasi-contract, the same fiction is embraced and entrenched
more deeply in the form of result-oriented fiduciary relationships.82 The damage is far
more severe, since what is corrupted by this fiction is more fragile and precious.
(2) In United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd." Lord Atkin dealt with the
nature of the waiver of tort doctrine. In that case, the defendant bank argued that once
the plaintiff had chosen to pursue the recipient of the proceeds of a stolen cheque, it
could no longer pursue the bank which cashed the cheque for conversion. The bank's
argument was that the plaintiff had chosen to affirm that the thief was its "agent" and
therefore, the ultimate recipient was liable in quasi-contract as a "borrower." The trial
court and the Court of Appeal both felt obliged, the former reluctantly, to adopt this
line of reasoning, in part because of the reasoning in Sinclair v. Brougham. Lord Atkin
in the House of Lords attacked the quasi-contract fiction in the following famous
passage:
These fantastic resemblances of contract invented in order to meet requirements of the law as to forms
of action which have now disappeared should not in these days be allowed to affect actual rights.
When these ghosts of the past stand in the path ofjustice clanking their medieval chains the proper
course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred."
Yet, even as he liberated the law from the quasi-contract error, he was implanting
another. He construed the waiver of tort argument as an argument about a choice of
remedies available to plaintiffs. The modern writers picked up on this idea of an
election of remedies, and the question for scholarship subsequently became what torts,
then what wrongs, can be waived.85 This question is pursued because it is thought that
The principle against unjust enrichment was not recognized in England until l.ipkin Gorman, supra
note 44. Similarly, the quasi-contract fiction was not unequivocally and finally rejected until
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council, [1996] 2 W.L.R.
802 (ILL.) (hereinafter Westdeutsche].
Supra note 69.
In the course of arguing that Sinclair v. Brougham, supra note 58, should not be totally overruled,
Lord GolT in Wesldeuische, supra note 80, said at 8)3: "recourse can at least be had to Sinclair
v. Brougham as authority for the proposition that, in such circumstances, the lender should not be
without a remedy. Indeed, 1 cannot think that English law, or equity, is so impoverished as to be
incapable of providing relief in such circumstances.... But for the present the case should in my
opinion stand, though confined in the manner I have indicated, as an assertion that those who are
caught in the trap of advancing money under ultra vires borrowing contracts will not be denied
appropriate relief."
|1941] A.C. 1 (ILL.) [hereinafter United Australia].
Ibid, at 29.
S. Hedley, "The Myth of'Waivcr of Tort'" (1984) 100 L.Q. Rev. 653 and G01T& Jones, 4th cd.,
supra note 25 at 720 ff. On the issue of the election remedies, sec Mahesan v. Malaysia
Government Officers'Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., |1979] A.C. 374, [1978) 2 All E.R. 405
(P.C.); Tand Min Sit v. Capacious Investments Ltd'., (I996| I A.C. SI4 (P.C); Island Records Ltd.
v. Tring International pic, [1995] 3 All E.R 444 (Ch.); and P. Bilks, "Inconsistency between
Compensation and Restitution" (1996) 112 L.Q. Rev. 375.
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the quasi-contract, now unjust enrichment argument, permits the plaintiff to recover
more than would be recoverable if the plaintiff were restricted to the plaintiffs tort
claim for the loss caused by the tort. This line of thinking is misguided in two respects.
It is misleading to ask about the availability of a remedy on any terms other than the
terms provided by the cause of action that justifies it. Define that first, and the waiver
question is redundant. If unjust enrichment is properly defined as non-consensual
receipt and retention, then, at most, there are two causes of action supporting the
plaintiffs recovery where there has been a theft, each of which requires proof of the
same loss. The second error is to think that the plaintiffs recovery in private law, in the
absence of reasons justifying a punitive element to the award, can ever be greater than
the loss caused the plaintiff by the defendant. Modern writers embrace these two ideas
even as they praise the liberation of the law from the quasi-contract fiction.
(3) The third example is in the law relating to "mistaken payment." The leading
Canadian decision was for many years, and perhaps still is, Royal Bank ofCanada v.
/?.86 In that case, an influential formulation establishing the right of a plaintiff to
recover for a mistaken payment was set out.87 Dysart J. established a four part rule:
1) the mistake must be honest; 2) the mistake must have been between the payer and
the receiver of the money; 3) the facts believed, if true, must have imposed a obligation
on the plaintiff to pay; and 4) the receiver of the money has no legal, equitable, or
moral right to retain it. In that case, the second condition was difficult to satisfy since
the mistaken transaction occurred between the plaintiff and a third party who had
induced the plaintiff to believe the money was owed to the payee, the province. Dysart
J. held that the second condition was met by virtue of the fact the payee kept the
money after it was asked to return it. In doing so, the payee was held to have
retroactively adopted the actions of the third party, thereby turning him into their
"agent." Note that if the second part of the test can be satisfied in this way, then the
second part of the test is entirely redundant because there will never be a mistaken
payment case where it cannot be satisfied.88
In 1979, Lord Goff fully re-examined the doctrine governing recovery of payments
made under a mistake of fact. He completely reformulated the test rightly leaving out
the "as between" requirement and the requirement that the mistaken fact if true entailed
a legal obligation in the payer to pay.89 Even as he liberated the law by removing two
redundant and misleading parts, he added at least four new unnecessary elements. Lord
Goff said the rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover payments made under a
mistake of fact where the mistake of fact caused the plaintiff to make the payment.
However, he also said that rule established only aprimafacie right to recover and the
plaintiffs claim would fail if: 1) the payer had intended the payee should have the
money at all events; 2) the payment was made for good consideration; and 3) the payee
(1931] 2 D.L.R 68S, I W.W.R. 709 (Man. K.B.) [hereinafter Royal Bank, cited to D.L.R.].
The test is set out in ibid, at 688-89. For a recent decision where the Tour part. Royal Bank rule
was applied, see Bank ofNova Scotia v. Passero & Passero (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 78 (D.C. Onl.).
See Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 25 at 210.
Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd, [1980] Q.B. 677 [hereinafter
Barclays Bank].
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had changed his position. Four features of his formulation of the mistake rule merit
comment, (a) Upon analysis, his first proviso against recovery is redundant since if,
under the prima facie test, the payment was really caused by the mistake, then it can
never be true that the payee intended the payer to have the money at all events, (b)
Lord Goff used the word "consideration" to express the second proviso. He thus gave
that term yet another function in English private law, and more seriously he thus
reintegrated contract ideas back into the test. The consideration in his test need not
move to the payor since, as in the case before him, the payee's argument was that he
had accepted the payment in discharge of a debt owed him by another party, the bank's
customer. It is not unlikely, however, that others will confuse his sense with the
traditional contract sense of consideration.90 The payee's point in this phase of the
argument is that the enrichment is no longer retained because simultaneously with the
receipt there was a change of position. Confusingly, this formulation is just a special
instance of the third proviso, (c) The third proviso derives from the basic logic of the
unjust enrichment argument — that the enrichment must be retained — but it is
positioned by Lord Goff as an additional consideration available on a somewhat
discretionary basis, as though it were optional, (d) Lord Goff drew a distinction
between the type of mistake which renders a transfer of title in money void and the
kind of mistake which grounds a right to recover the money in the law of mistaken
payment. He said: "The kind of mistake that will ground recovery [in restitution] is far
wider than the kind of mistake which would vitiate intention to transfer property."91
With respect, is the point here simply that in the case of currency, subject to a few
exceptional cases, possession is title? Does not the same point apply to money that is
stolen? Are there different types of theft? In other words, is not the distinction sought
after here one between the different following (title) rules of a peculiar kind of thing
(currency), and not between different types of mistake? Why, in any event, burden
English law with yet another distinction if the outcome of both mistake doctrines is the
same, namely a right to recover the amount paid by mistake in priority to all other
claims against the recipient?
(4) A fourth misleading innovation has occurred in the definition of the elements of
the defendant's side of the argument in an unjust enrichment claim. The defendant's
argument is that he is not required to return more than he has. If a valuation is required
in effecting restitution, that valuation must therefore be effected from the defendant's,
as well as the plaintiffs, point of view. In the controversial case of services, no
defendant is required to pay more than the services are worth to him and assessing that
worth takes into account, among other things, issues of affordability and spending
priority.
Approaches which are overly inclusive in their definition of unjust enrichment —
which do not put some of the services cases into negotiorum gestio or into contract and
civil responsibility where they properly belong — have been obliged to be less
generous in the formulation of the defendant's side of the argument. Unless they give
less to the defendant by way of defense, many intuitively meritorious cases might result
Sec the majority decision in David Securities, supra note 72 for an example.
Barclays Bank, supra note 89.
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in a denial of recovery on their theory of the subject. This strategy distorts the
definition of the cause of action.
One such innovation is the concept of "incontrovertible benefit."92 Incontrovertible
benefit was invented to deal with the difficult case of Craven-Ellis.9i In that case, a
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant corporation was void because the
defendant corporation's board was improperly constituted at the date the contract was
entered into. Commentators on the decision (although not the court in the decision
itself) have argued that quantum meruil was not available on the facts because there had
been no free acceptance — there was no board to freely accept — yet the plaintiff did
the work that the corporation required. Hence, it is argued that there is a need for the
concept of "incontrovertible benefit" to show enrichment.
The case would be solved today, under modern corporation law, with provisions such
as §128 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act which states that acts done by
directors are not invalidated by reason only that there is some defect in their
appointment.94 Craven-Ellis, as suggested above, may therefore be another instance
of vitiated doctrine: the deficient understanding of English private law of the
corporation led to corruption in another area to accommodate justice.9'
L. GofT & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) at 144
[hereinafter Goff & Jones, 3d. ed.] where they argue that restitution should be available when "it
can be shown that the defendant has gained a financial benefit readily realisable, without detriment
to himself, or has been saved an inevitable expense." The concept has two parts: it covers cases
where the benefit has been conferred in the form of services to land or a chattel with the resulting
increase in value in the defendant's patrimony isolated in the chattel or land improved; and
situations where services are provided and nothing of tangible value can be found in the
defendant's patrimony that represents the value of the services, for example, where the plaintiff
gives some performance to the defendant. See J. Beatson "Benefit, Reliance and the Structure of
Unjust Enrichment" (1992) 40 Curr. Legal Prob. 71 for a definition of pure services. The writers
generally recognize that there is no explicit recognition of the concept incontrovertible benefit in
the common law but they often cite that the concept has been implicitly recognized. But almost
all if not all of the decisions cited in support of the concept — Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v.
Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1979), 7 BLR. I (Ont. H.C.J.); Re Jacques (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 447
(N.S. Co. Ct.); Craven-Ellis, supra note 59; Carleton (County) v. Ollaua (City), [I96S] S.C.R.
663, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220; and Boulton v. Jones (1857), 157 E.R. 232; 112 H. & N. 564 (Q.B.) —
are cases that could readily be shown to be instances of a "vitiated" doctrine whose results could
be more accurately justified on other grounds.
Supra note 59.
Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1982, c. 4, s. 128. Another example would be the
Canadian Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §16 (3) [hereinafter C.B.C.A.] which
says: "No act of a corporation, including any transfer of property to or by a corporation, is invalid
by reason only that the act or transfer is contrary to its articles or this Act."
Similarly other examples of its application might more convincingly be addressed by other
doctrines. The situations that remain do not require the idea of incontrovertibility. For example,
Goff and Jones, 4th ed., supra note 25 at 30, give the example of a supplier of oil delivering it to
the defendant's house instead of the house of the defendant's neighbour with whom the supplier
has a contract to supply oil. Thus, on these facts, value was transferred by the plaintiff to the
defendant by mistake but the oil is consumed and there is nothing apparently in the defendant's
patrimony corresponding to the benefit. Few people would disagree that the defendant has received
a benefit. The question is whether the defendant is allowed a change of position defense. But to
argue change of position the defendant would have to argue that the receipt of oil from the
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"Incontrovertible benefit" is corrupting because it is a contradiction in fundamental
terms: in private law, as in the market, valuations (benefits) are subjective, not
"objective" in the way "incontrovertible" suggests. Incontrovertible benefit is therefore
likely to mislead adjudicators on the critical elements on the defendant's side of the
argument in unjust enrichment. The self-contradictory concept may have been invented
in part to indicate that there are cases where defendants may not tell the whole truth
about their valuation of the enrichment. Even so, it adds nothing to the argument. We
can just say, in the appropriate case and as a matter of fact, we do not believe the
defendant.
D. The Deeply Embedded Nature of the Quasi-Contract Thinking
The complaint here is that much of unjust enrichment thinking remains contaminated
with contract ideas about liability. The single most important doctrinal element in this
claim is quasi-contract, but other contract-like doctrines have had an influence as well.
Three examples are provided.
1. Change of Position
There is a lingering view in the law that one encounters from time to time that the
defense of change of position has something to do with estoppel.'6 There is also a
view, held even by those who agree that change of position has nothing to do with
estoppel, that the acceptance of the change of position argument into the law of
restitution is somehow optional, or at least an additional question that has to be
separately addressed.97 Both of these views are based on an inadequate conception of
unjust enrichment as a source of obligation and therefore, are distorted doctrines. The
point in contention where a defendant argues change of position is whether he still
retains the enrichment received at the plaintiffs expense, and therefore, whether he is
or is not liable under a "non-consensual receipt and retention of value at the plaintiffs
expense" argument. To show "non-retention," the defendant must demonstrate that,
simultaneously with, or subsequent to the receipt, there has been a consumption,
dissipation or destruction of value that would not have occurred but for the receipt.
plaintiff caused him to consume oil that he would not otherwise have consumed. On the Tacts, that
is not the case and therefore the defendant has not changed position — the defendant would have
purchased and consumed oil even had the plaintiff not supplied it. In such a manner a simple
analysis based on finding a receipt and a retention of value establishes a claim in the plaintiff. The
only remaining question is the quantum of the benefit. In conformity with the suggestion made
above, the quantum could not be established at a higher amount than the subjective value of the
oil to the plaintiff and (lie defendant.
Estoppel fixes the representing party with the truth of his statement. Logically, this type of
argument is subject to a number of plausible interpretations, but a main one is that the representing
party is treated this way because he is taken to have warranted (promised) implicitly that his
statement is true.
See, e.g., Lipkin Gorman, supra note 44, Barclays Bank, supra note 89, and R. v. Touvr Hamlets
London Borough Council. Ex parle Chetnik Developments Ltd., [1988] A.C. 858. I All E.R 961
(H.L.).
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The failure to recognize the nature of the change of position argument in each ofthe
two ways suggested has led to two distortions. Regarding the second, there is a recent
formulation of the defense in the House of Lord's decision in Lipkirt Gorman™ In that
decision, Lord Goff, who is in the camp of those who believe that English law ought
to recognize a defense of change of position," formulated its availability (as he did
in Barclay's Bank), as discretionary: "[T]he defense is available to a person whose
position has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require
him to make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full."100 One can accept
that a first formulation of a doctrine might be cautious and leave some scope for
judicial discretion and development, so perhaps it is unfair to criticize this formulation
for lacking conviction or commitment. There is also, one suspects, an element of
hedging here: one difficulty lurking in the background is that any new formulation of
change of position should not permit a defendant to be exonerated where, as in Lamer
v. London County Council,m there had been some element of wrongdoing on the part
ofthe defendant. However, a proper formulation ofthe defense could easily address this
fear by acknowledging that the defense is available only where the plaintiffs argument
is based solely on unjust enrichment. Where the plaintiff also has a argument based on
fault, such as theft or duress, the defense of change of position is irrelevant.102
Therefore, plaintiffs in positions similar to those in Lamer would be protected.
The first distortion due to the estoppel connection is the more serious one. There are
two parts to an estoppel argument. The first is that the person estopped has made some
representation of fact; and the second, that the other party has relied on the
representation to his detriment. At a minimum, the estoppel argument precludes the first
person from denying the truth of the representation to the extent that such denial would
result in a reliance loss.101 The defense of change of position is similar but different
in at least one very important respect. When a defendant argues change of position it
is not a necessary part of his argument that he show that the change of position
occurred as a result of his or her reliance on some representation made by the plaintiff.
All the defendant need show is that had the defendant not received the value from the
plaintiff, the defendant would not have suffered some subsequent patrimonial loss. For
example, if a bank teller mistakenly overpays the bank's customer at the teller's wicket
and the customer walks out the door and is immediately robbed of all the money in his
possession, the customer can argue change of position since had the customer not
received the money, the theft of the money could not have occurred.
*" Supra note 44.
'" Previous authority was against it, see, e.g., Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] I Ch. D. 127
(C.A.).
"" Lipkin Gorman, supra note 44 at 580 [emphasis added].
"" 11949| 2 K.B. 683 (C.A.).
"" Sec, e.g.. Restatement of Restitution, supra note 11 at §142(3) which states: "Change of
circumstances is not a defense if (a) the conduct of the recipient in obtaining, retaining or dealing
with the subject matter was tortious."
"" Hence its classification here as contract or contract-like. The person estopped is treated as
warranting the truth of the representation.
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The defense of change of position has been mixed up with estoppel arguments in the
law because of the historic unavailability of unjust enrichment as a source of obligation.
Estoppel was the only available doctrine that came close to expressing the necessary
ideas, so it was pressed into service.104 But the doctrine, naturally enough, gives a
distorted presentation of the necessary elements.
In Avon County Council v. Howlett,10* the court held that the fact of payment itself
is the representation that is required in order to generate an estoppel argument. This is
an extraordinarily odd doctrine: what the law gives with the mistaken payment claim
it immediately takes away with the estoppel argument, provided there is some
detrimental reliance.106 The court also held that any detrimental reliance of the
defendant at all, even if it did not result in the defendant consuming, dissipating or
destroying all the value in a way that he would not have but for the receipt, entailed
that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading that the representation was false and
therefore, the plaintiffs claim failed. If this logic were followed it would be a rare
unjust enrichment claim that would succeed.
There is no need, as already suggested, to find any representation whatsoever in
order to generate a change of position defense. Further, the change of position argument
is of avail only to the extent of the change of position. It is important to be clear about
this and the only way to be clear about it is to cast the defense as a necessary element
of the cause of action in unjust enrichment, and not as estoppel. It is true that there is
often a very important connection between the fact of payment (or in the misguided
estoppel construal, the "representation implicit in the fact of payment") and the
defendant's change of position. The connection, however, is logically different from the
"representation-inducing-reliance" argument of the estoppel doctrine. It is illustrated in
the example of the teller's overpayment to the bank customer — the defendant can
clearly show that, but for the payment, there would not have been the subsequent loss
of the money paid by mistake.
To take another example, consider the facts of the recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Kenora (Town) Hydro Electric Commission v. Vacationland Dairy Co
operative Ltd.wl In that case, the defendant paid for its hydro at a lower rate than
required, relying on the plaintiffs mistaken bills. The defendant has to show that it
relied on those statements which purportedly established the state of accounts between
the plaintiff and defendant. This reliance helps show that it was the money mistakenly
not collected that was subsequently spent. But this argument is not an estoppel
argument since the point of picking out the fact of payment or the "representation" in
it is not, as in an estoppel argument, to fix the plaintiff with the responsibility for the
Jones (RE). Lid. v. Waring andGillow, Ltd., [19261 AC. 670.95 LJ.K.B. 913 (H.L.) [hereinafter
Jones v. Waring]; Holt v. Markham, supra note 75; and, Skyring v. Greenwood and Cox (1825),
4 B. & C. 281, 6 D. & R. 401 [hereinafter Skyring).
[1983| I W.L.R. 605, [1983] I All E.R. 1073 (C.A.) [hereinafter Avon).
One of ihe judges would have allowed the plaintiff to go on to argue the retention of the money
not spent was recoverable because retaining it was unconscionable. So the law gives, takes away,
then gives back the claim! See the decision of Cummings-Bruce, L.J. in Avon, ibid.
[1994] I SCR. 80, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 449 [hereinafter Kenora).
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truth of the statement. Rather, the point is to show which funds were dissipated. If that
point is not appreciated, then the defense of change of position remains under a cloud,
unnecessarily distorted.108 An example of the continuing tendency to distortion can
be found in the formulation of the doctrine by Justice Major:
The defense or estoppel (earlier in the paragraph, he speaks of the defense of estoppel or change of
position) is thus an expression of what the common law has considered to be sufficient justification
to release a defendant from liability in the pursuit of fairness.m
Our suggestion is that it is not a question of fairness at all, rather it is a question of
whether or not the cause of action in unjust enrichment is made out on the facts of the
case.
2. THE DEFENDANT'S WILL AND FREE ACCEPTANCE
In the cause of action as defined, the quality of will required of the defendant and
plaintiff is essentially different from what is required in a contract argument. Formation
of a contract requires that there be a consensus ad idem. That requirement makes sense
from a functional perspective, since contract is valued just because it facilitates
coordination and cooperation. Of course, intrinsically it makes sense simply because
that is what a contract is. By contrast, in unjust enrichment the wills of the parties are
important on three entirely different questions: first, we need to know whether the
transfer of value occurred without the consent of the plaintiff; second we need to know
whether and how the plaintiff values the benefit transferred so we can establish the
quantum of the loss suffered; and third, we need to know whether and how the
defendant values the benefit received and still retained.
Some modern writers argue that "free acceptance" of the benefit by the defendant
is relevant in the analysis of a claim in unjust enrichment. "Free acceptance" is defined
as occurring when a defendant stands by and accepts a transfer of value from a
plaintiff, who he knows expects payment, without intervening to stop the plaintiff or
to tell the plaintiff that he has no intention of paying. Historically, a quantum meruit
action for the value of services rendered to the defendant required that the defendant
have requested or, at the least, freely accepted the services. Modern writers have picked
up on this strain of quasi-contract reasoning and have argued that free acceptance
establishes both that the transfer of value was unjust and that the receipt of value,
usually in the form of services, was of value to the defendant. For some, this latter
application additionally entails that the defendant is precluded from arguing that the
value received is worth less to him than it was to the plaintiff. The concept that the
defendant's valuation is relevant is sometimes referred to as "subjective devaluation,"
and it is said that where there is free acceptance, there can be no subjective devaluation.
Examples of this distortion can be seen in Jones v. Waring, supra note 104, Holt v. Markham,
supra note 75, and Skyring, supra note 104.
Kcnora, supra note 107 at III, Major J.
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Both aspects of the free acceptance argument — as an unjust factor and as
determinative on the valuation question — have been criticized convincingly by several
authors.110 On the first application, as an unjust factor, it is likely that the only basis
for imposing liability on a freely accepting defendant is either that the circumstances
of the free acceptance constituted an implicit promise by the defendant to pay the
plaintiff i.e., contract, or the circumstances of the transaction were such that the
defendant was under some duty to intervene and advise the plaintiff of the plaintiffs
error, i.e., civil responsibility. For the first interpretation to be true, there would have
to have been some communication, probably implicit, by the defendant to the plaintiff
for the minds to meet.1" The circumstances would have to be somewhat unusual for
the second to occur since the circumstances would have to raise in the defendant a
positive duty to act in the interest of the plaintiff by disabusing him of his mistaken
impression that the defendant would pay him. One apparent difficulty with the second
application — on the valuation question — is that it conflates the issue of receipt with
the issue of valuation of the receipt and the valuation of the value retained. Another is
that it misconstrues the relevance of and/or overstates the weight to be attached to the
fact that the defendant freely accepts the transfer: at most, the defendant's free
acceptance is merely evidence — not necessarily strong and certainly not conclusive
evidence — that the defendant values a receipt in some way.
These theories concerning the relevance of free acceptance to the law of unjust
enrichment are used to help explain cases where the value transferred was in the form
of services and occasionally goods. Usually, in addition to the free acceptance argument
concerning the establishment of the "unjust factor," there are other "unjust factors,"
invariably mistake. For example, the value may have been transferred under a mistaken
belief that the plaintiff was the owner of the thing improved or affected by the services,
or the plaintiff may have believed that the value was being transferred under a valid
contract which imposed a legally enforceable obligation on the defendant to
reciprocate."2 Occasionally too, the arguments are deployed where there has been a
discharge or breach of a contract. As some of the arguments below on the doctrine of
G. Mead, "Free Acceplancc: Some Further Considerations" (1989) 105 L.Q. Rev. 460; and A.S.
Burrows, "Free Acceptance and the Law of Restitution" (1988) 104 L.Q. Rev. 576.
This inability to sec a contract is caused by the very weak recognition in the common law
mentality of what may for present purposes be called implicit terms — terms not expressed by the
parties, but readily inferred from the circumstances. This lack of recognition is one of the root
causes of the free acceptance problems and is a reason why this contract solution might seem so
radical to some common lawyers. But see, Sinclair v. Purdy, 186 N.Y. 245 (C.A. 1923) at 213,
Cardozo J. citing himself in Wood v. Lucy. Udy Dug-Gordon, 164 N.Y. 576 (C.A. 1917) where
he states that: "Though a promise in words was lacking, the whole transaction, it might be found,
was 'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly expressed." Or the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts, supra note 21, § 5 comment (a): "Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied.
The distinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of
manifesting assent."
If there truly is no contract, then the performance is mistaken in the requisite way. Thus, the law
of performances pursuant to "defective contracts" ought to be divided into those cases, like
Deglman, identified above, where there really is a contract that cannot be fully enforced, and those
where there is no contract at all. That project would have to sort through the ultra vires cases
carefully, since that doctrine too, is somewhat suspect, as the modern reforms of it in the modern
corporations statutes show. See Ramsden v. Dysen (1866), L.R. I H.L. 129, 12 Jur. (N.S.) 506.
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total failure of consideration demonstrate, there are better arguments in contract that
remain fully available but that have been, in this context and in large measure,
overlooked. Hence, as the criticisms advanced by others have shown, free acceptance
as an unjust factor is redundant because the difficulties presented by these fact
situations can be handled by other more relevant principals. With respect to its
application as an "unjust factor," our suggestion is that it is another example of the
harm done to the law of unjust enrichment by the contractual connection. In this
instance, an element of a contract argument was transposed, mistakenly, into unjust
enrichment doing harm to both causes of action. At best, the most that might be said
of the doctrine of free acceptance is that on the benefit to the defendant issue, it is a
relevant but inconclusive contribution when the benefit is in the form of services.
3. Officiousness and The Plaintiff's will
A related problem happens on the plaintiffs side of the claim. Some modern writers
would restrict the plaintiffs right to recover to cases where the plaintiff can prove that
he was not "officious.""1 The relevance and import of the concept officiousness, or
more widely, "voluntariness" is not always made clear. It is sometimes used as the
contrary of "involuntary" or "vitiated," and therefore negatively contributing to the
definition of "unjust" or "without cause." In this use, it is redundant and inaccurate. It
is redundant because all cases where recovery ought to permitted should be sufficiently
described by whatever is chosen as the definition of "unjust" or "without cause." If
those who maintain that the concept has some utility are defining unjust to mean
"involuntary," then it adds little to their definition by also saying "and voluntary
transfers are not recoverable." It is inaccurate because, according to the definition
advanced in Part II, at least, unjust does not really mean "involuntary," but more
narrowly, non-consensual. A fully voluntary act is an expression of free will; a
consensual act, however, may be coerced or motivated by error. Only if there is no
consent, can there be unjust enrichment.
The term voluntary causes some additional difficulties because it is sometimes used
in a second sense. For example, in Morgan v. Ashcroft,11* "voluntary" was used
synonymously with "gratuitous" (or at least with "not legally obligated") so that a
voluntary payment made by mistake, which would be a contradiction in terms in the
first sense, was held irrecoverable.
Where does this term come from? The suggestion is that it is part of the mix-up with
contract. The mistake was to apply classifications of qualities of will — voluntary (free
of coercion and error in motive) and gratuitous (liberal intention) — that are perfectly
valid and useful in contract law to the law of unjust enrichment, where they are of only
'" Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 25 at 681 ff. See also, the Restatement of Restitution, supra
note II at § 2 which states: "A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not
entitled to restitution therefor."
114 [1938] I K.B. 49, 106 L.J.K.B. S44 (C.A.) [hereinafter Morgan].
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limited relevance. The remedy to this confusion is to focus simply on whether the
transfer was "without cause.""5
Can this be done? Can the current law of unjust enrichment do without these two
concepts of voluntary? There are three current uses of the term: the common law
situations which would be treated as (1) negoliorum gestio, (2) suretyship, or (3) gift
in a civil law system."6 (a) It is used in the first sense in the common law's proto-
doctrine of negotiorum gestio. It functions to exclude useless and unnecessary, i.e.,
"officious" interventions. Although an adequate doctrine of negotiorum gestio would
have to establish which managements attract the doctrine, "officiousness," does not
draw the right line, at least if the civilian experience is any guide. In any event, as has
already been suggested, negotiorum gestio has very little to do with unjust enrichment,
(b) In recoupment, it is also used in the first sense. "Officious" sureties cannot recover
from the debtor. That, at least, is what Owen v. Tate says. We have already argued that
this view is part of a larger error, and that the decision in Owen v. Tate is incorrect, (c)
That leaves gift, where it is used in the second sense. The argument that true gifts are
not recoverable in unjust enrichment hardly merits its own special doctrine. The
suggestion that mistaken gifts are not recoverable in unjust enrichment must be false.
So it appears the cause of action in unjust enrichment does not require doctrines that
describe the plaintiffs will as "voluntary" or "involuntary." Simply ask, was it a
transfer, gratuitous or onerous, without cause, i.e. by mistake, theft or finding?
E. Problems in the Definition of Contract
Even though much of the effort over the past several decades has been addressed at
reversing the damage caused by the quasi-contract fiction, there are important elements
of the fiction which still survive. This was the point of the previous section. What is
less often noticed is the injury that the law of contract suffers through its historic
association with quasi-contract and the ever expanding notion of restitution as an
organizing idea. There are two characteristic modes of this problem. (1) Often a
traditionally available remedial response is not obviously explicable as an instance of
contract liability, so in the decades-long re-organization of contract law, it gravitates
to the quasi-contract half. Perhaps the most important example of this phenomenon is
the modern rendering of the total failure of consideration argument. (2) Often the
common law's understanding of contract is confused because it lacks the concept of
In the civil law the term used to denote this cause of action is traditionally "Enrichissemeni sans
cause" or enrichment without cause, see, e.g., Malauric & Aynes, t. 5, supra note 36 at 541. In
Quebec the term now used — "Enrichissemeni injusiifie" — more closely resembles the common
law's formulation, see, e.g., Baudouin, supra note 36 at 335. In any case, the tendency to define
what is "without cause" or "justified" remains. For example, Art. 1494 C.C.Q., supra note 14
states: "Enrichment or impoverishment is justified where it results from the performance of an
obligation, from the failure of the person impoverished to exercise a right of which he may avail
himself or could have availed himself against the person enriched, or from an act performed by
the person impoverished for his personal and exclusive interest or at his own risk or peril, or with
a constant liberal intention."
See Arts. 1482-90 (negoliorum geslio), 2333-66 (suretyship) & 1806-41 (Gift) C.C.Q., supra note
14 and Arts. 1372-75 (negoliorum geslio), 2011-43 (suretyship) & 893 ff. (Gift) C. civ.
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special contract and the family of ideas that goes with it. Two examples of this
phenomenon are the special contract of suretyship and the fiduciary obligation. We will
examine (1) the tfc problem in some detail and (2) the fiduciary obligation problem
very briefly.
1. QUASI-CONTRACT'S RliVENGE: TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
The clearest example of a common law doctrine that should be in the law of contract
but has ended up in the law of restitution, is total failure of consideration (tfc). Tfc is
an instance of what might be called the "restitution" fiction: the view that if the remedy
provided by an old doctrine looks like restitution, the source of the obligation must be
unjust enrichment. It is suggested the error happens in the following way.
Many modern writers treat a total failure of consideration — the complete or "total"
failure of the defendant to reciprocate with the expected consideration, namely, the
performance of his promise — as an unjust factor. As just formulated, the notion itself
contains the essential clue to its proper classification. Since the doctrine is about
disappointed expectations, and since the vast majority of expectations protected at law
are those fostered by legally enforceable promises, the solution to this difficulty must
be found in contract. However, the writers who take a different view construe the
plaintiffs prior giving of his own performance, historically a price, as a conditional
giving. In order to keep the prestation, the money paid as a price, the defendant must
perform."7 When the defendant breaches, the right to keep the money is lost and the
defendant must return it, otherwise he is unjustly enriched (money had and received
upon a consideration which has wholly failed). Alternatively, but to the same effect, it
is said that the plaintiff may rescind the contract ab initio for breach, and get his prior
performance back in restitution. The principal error here is to treat a performance given
in expectation of a reciprocal performance as a conditional transfer of property.
In the usual case, a plaintiff who performs in expectation of a reciprocation remains
the contract creditor he was prior to the performance. The only change that has
occurred is that he has taken a further risk of the defendant's creditworthiness through
his essential reliance. It is the "return" of this "cost" that is sought under the tfc
doctrine. Historically, the central case of the doctrine is the case where the plaintiffs
prior performance is the payment of a price. Keeping this key fact in mind, it is easy
to show that the argument supporting recovery is a simple contract damage argument,
In a recent JCPC decision, Kensington v. Unrepresented Non-allocated Claimants, [1994) J.CJ.
No. 19 (P.C.) (hereinafter Kensington], counsel for the plaintiff took this corruption of contract
into unjust enrichment a step further. In Kensington, a proprietary claim was rejected where the
seller had breached his obligation under a contract or sale. The buyers' counsel argued that a
proprietary claim was available on the basis of mistake. The mistake alleged was that the buyers
believed that (lie sellers would perform their promises to purchase gold bullion on their behalf.
They also, of course, attempted to argue that they were entitled to a proprietary interest in the
money they had paid in advance on the basis that, since they had received nothing, a tfc, they were
entitled to rescind the contract and get their money back.
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not a restitution argument."8 In a simple contract claim (one involving no
consequential loss), a party who has performed and received nothing in exchange is
entitled only to the other party's performance in full. The valuation of that performance
is effected from the plaintiffs point of view since the objective of the court's
intervention is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss caused him by the breach. What
is the money value of the defendant's performance from the plaintiffs point of view?
One very good measure of the money value to the plaintiff of the other party's
performance is the price the plaintiff agreed to pay for it. Therefore giving "that price"
"back" is a very effective means of quantifying just compensation. In reality, though,
it is not a giving back, it is an award of damages for breach where the loss is measured
by the price given.
This is not to suggest that there are not instances where a prior performance is
actually (implicitly or explicitly) given conditionally. But even in these situations, the
prior performing party, unless there is also a trust, bailment or other such fiduciary
relationship consensually created, accepts the further credit risk imposed by the other
party's promise to return the prior performance if the condition for its return (breach)
obtains. Under this less usual scenario, it is fundamental that the prior performance be
of a type that can in fact be returned. Money and goods fit this description, but services
never do. One important conclusion that follows from both sets of analysis (i.e., the
usual and less usual cases) is that since the whole argument is based in contract, the
plaintiff is thereby restricted by contract valuations. In other words, the point always
is to compensate for the loss caused by the breach.
How did the unjust enrichment construal of tfc get started? As is so often the case
with the common law, this mistaken doctrine was initially a case of vitiated doctrine
— a doctrine that was pressed into service to do justice under circumstances where the
common law was clearly inadequate. The starting point in the modern thinking on tfc
is Lord Atkin's decision in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
Barbour, Ltd."9 The plaintiff had paid £1,000 in advance on a contract with an
English company which had promised, in return, to sell machinery to the plaintiff for
£4800. The contract was frustrated by the outbreak of war and before any part of the
defendant's promise had been performed. The House of Lords allowed the plaintiff to
recover the money paid in advance on the basis of tfc. Lord Wright, in one of the
leading statements in English jurisprudence, rationalized the right to recover as being
based on the principle of unjust enrichment: "any civilized system of law is bound to
provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust
benefit...."120 This was the first occasion on which tfc had been used in the context
of a frustrated contract and its application to frustration facts on the basis of the unjust
The central cases or tfc historically were cases where money was advanced for a negotiable
instrument or other fungible and readily convertible form of value, that was for some reason,
defective. In those cases, the basis of recovery from the modern perspective would be contract.
The damages for breach of the promise that the defective negotiable instrument is good, arc equal
exactly to the money paid since in this instance the money paid is equal to the value of the
defendant's promise which, in turn, is equal to the amount mentioned in the negotiable instrument.
[1943] A.C. 32, [19421 2 All E.R. 122 (A.C.) [hereinafter Fibrosa cited to AC).
Ibid, at 61.
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enrichment rationale was, and still is, generally praised by the academic writers on the
law of restitution.121
That something was done to redress the unacceptable treatment of frustration in
Chandler v. Webstetm was certainly laudable. Our suggestion here is that the ground
of the intervention could not have been unjust enrichment, since at the date of transfer
the prestation was given consensually, just as certainly as it could not have been
contract as the common law aptly says, the contract was frustrated. The case of
frustration is generally recognized as presenting difficult problems ofjustice, but these
are problems of distributive justice not corrective justice. This is evident from the facts
and resolution of the Fibrosa case itself: the Fibrosa solution, as has been observed by
most commentators, was unfair to the seller in Fibrosa who had made expenditures in
preparation for its performance.m The clear injustice of imposing these entirely on
the seller is not addressed at all in the Fibrosa doctrine. What is required in a case of
a frustration is a localized distributive solution, whether imposed by statute or
otherwise, on the model of the "just and equitable" winding up of a corporation or
partnership.124 In designing the rules to govern the distribution, benefits received
under the contract would certainly have to be taken into account, but the fact they
should be taken into account, by itself, does not make the cause of action of unjust
enrichment relevant to the discussion. Similarly, the mere fact that a restitution is called
for does not entail that the source of the obligation is unjust enrichment. Subsequent
to the Fibrosa decision, legislation reformed the generally inadequate common law
treatment of frustration.125 Unfortunately, the "vitiated" doctrine — tfc as an unjust
factor — survives to this day.
The continuation of the unjust enrichment construal of tfc has led to a number of
what we would submit are false problems in the current writing. In what follows, we
provide several illustrations and examples.
a. Tfc and the Issue of "Total" Failure
First, consider what was above called the usual case, the case where the plaintiff
gives a prior non-conditional performance and the defendant breaches. Consider further
its standard instance, where the plaintiffs prior performance is the payment of a price.
If the plaintiffs performance was the payment of a price, and the defendant has given
nothing under the contract to the plaintiff, then the plaintiffs loss measured by the
See, e.g., Goff & Jones, 4th ed., supra note 25 at 418-19.
[1904], I K.B. 493, 73 L.J.K.B. 401 (C.A.).
See, e.g., Golf & Jones, 4th cd, supra note 25 at 418 IT.
See, e.g.. Winding-lip and Restructuring Act. R.S.C. 1996, c. 6.
See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (U.K.), 6 & 7 Gco. 6, c. 40. All Canadian
provinces, except British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan ultimately adopted uniform
legislation substantially similar to the U.K. act based upon the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting (1948), see
Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 25 at 404. Sec, e.g., Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c. 179. In British Columbia a new and substantially improved version that modified the U.K. Act
was passed, see Frustrated Contract Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 144.
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contract damage rule is at least as much as the payment, since his valuation of the
defendant's performance on the date for performance in most situations is at least equal
to the price he agreed to pay. These are, essentially, the facts and outcome in the
famous case of Rowland v. Divall,U6 where the seller breached his obligation to
convey title. In most situations like this, as already suggested, the plaintiff is entitled,
at the least, to "his" money "back."
What function does the tfc condition serve in this simple and central case? Quite
simply, it establishes that this very straightforward solution to the damage calculation
problem — giving the plaintiff "back" "his" money — is available on the facts of the
case. Some modern writers who conceive of this intervention as based on unjust
enrichment, argue that requiring the failure be "total" is arbitrary, and that the unjust
enrichment claim should extend to cases where the failure is only partial.127 Others
argue over what should count as a consideration sufficient to preclude the use of the
doctrine. These questions when posed as questions in the law of unjust enrichment are
unanswerable. Ask those same questions while conceiving of tfc as an contract damage
rule, they are easily answered. Of course the plaintiff can also argue that he is entitled
to at least his cost (the price) less the extent to which receipts from the defendant have
reduced this loss. In appropriate circumstances this would be the obvious, most
effective way to measure the loss caused by the breach.
A recent decision of the High Court of Australia, Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon™
illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise if the tfc rule is construed as based in
unjust enrichment. In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger on a cruise ship. The
cruise was to last for fourteen days but on the tenth day, the ship sank. The plaintiff
sued for the price back, arguing in part that the failure need not be total in order for the
plaintiff to be able to sue in unjust enrichment. The Court rejected the tfc argument and
allowed the plaintiff to recover damages "in contract" for distress. The Court
mistakenly categorized the tfc argument as an instance ofan action in unjust enrichment
and in part conceived of the issue as a competition between mutually exclusive causes
of action, one in unjust enrichment for restitution and the other in contract for damages
for breach of contract. The fact that the failure of consideration was not total was
selected by the court as the determinative criterion in making the choice of contract
over unjust enrichment. The suggestion here is that this debate — whether the failure
has to be total in order to sue in unjust enrichment — is based on a fundamental
misconception as to the nature of the tfc rule. What is misunderstood is that the
discussion is really about two methods of calculating the damages flowing from a
breach of contract, and not about mutually exclusive rights or even mutually exclusive
remedies. On the facts like Baltic Shipping, the use of the tfc method of calculation is
not convenient or helpful, since the principal element of the plaintiffs loss was the
disappointment and distress arising from the breach, which in part is a consequential
reliance loss and in part an expectation interest loss. If that loss is fully compensated,
then the defendant's breach is remedied and it can keep the price.
(1923) 2 K.B. 500. 92 LJ.K.B. 1041 (C.A.) (hereinafter Rowland v. Dtvall].
Sec, e.g.. Burrows, supra note 25 at 255 IT.
(The Mikhail Lermonlov) (1993), 67 A.LJ.R. 228 (H.C.).
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b. Tfc and Services
The construal of the tfc doctrine as a contract damage calculation rule is often
overlooked due to the influence of the misleading metaphor that contract damages are
about going ahead, and that recovery in civil responsibility and unjust enrichment are
about going back. Tfc looks like "going back" not "going forward." This error is aided
and abetted by the fiction of rescission — the retroactive removal of the contract —
since it is sometimes said that where there is tfc, the contract is rescinded ab initio and
restitution is ordered. Rescission is a fiction: nothing anybody does today can change
what happened yesterday, even if they are an academic lawyer, judge or legislator; it
is impossible to get rid of the contract ab initio. The most we can say is that the case
should be solved as though there were no contract, but if that is the meaning of the
conclusion, some reason must be given for adopting it. Breach of contract cannot be
the reason because all the fact of breach justifies is reversal of the harm caused by the
breach. To date, no one has provided a satisfactory reason for solving the case of
breach of contract as though the contract was never made. No one ever will since the
argument is incoherent. What does it mean to solve a case of breach of contract as
though there never was a contract? It does not compute. Putting the metaphor and
fiction aside, it is simpler if we say that all recovery in private law, no matter what the
cause of action, is intended to compensate for loss caused by the breach, the wrong, or
the non-consensual receipt and retention. This applies to all recovery unless what we
are talking about is part of the private law of punitive interventions, but if that is what
is happening here, then the common law should say so.
There is no need in the law of contract damages for the going ahead metaphor or the
retroactive removal fiction. However, if the metaphor and the fiction are in control, then
it may seem natural to ask whether a tfc-type argument is also available where the
plaintiffs prior performance is in the form of services. Can the plaintiff rescind the
contract and sue in quantum meruit to get the value of her services back? Ifwe say yes,
then it would seem natural to conclude as well that the plaintiff gets the value of the
services back even when this value, measured from her point of view, exceeds the
contract price. If we allow that, then we allow the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant a loss caused by her bad bargaining, not by the breach. This would be
absurd. An American case, Boomer v. Muirm is often cited as authority for a positive
answer to this question, since the court in that case allowed the plaintiff to recover an
amount greater than the amount owing under the contract on the basis of a "rescission-
then-restitution" argument. On the facts of that case, the recovery could as easily have
been justified as compensation for consequential losses. In principle, if the forgoing
arguments concerning the true nature of the tfc argument are accepted, the question
"restitution for breach?" is a non-starter, since a plaintiff in contract is restricted to
contract damages.
Recall that the argument which gives the restitution-for-breach some initial
plausibility arises in the case where the prior performance is the payment of a price. We
can use metaphors and fictions with impunity and without harm in the case of prices
'" 24 P. 2d 570 (Cal. D.C.A. 1933).
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since talking about giving "the" money "back" or giving "back" the price is always
exactly the same thing, in terms of outcomes, as talking about compensating the
plaintiff for the loss caused by the breach. Services, unlike money, however, cannot be
returned. To do justice between the parties we have to move from the services to their
money value. How much money? Not, it is submitted, the value of the services. It has
to be the value of the defendant's performance since the objective is to compensate the
plaintiff for the loss caused by the defendant's breach of the defendant's performance.
It was argued above that it is a mistake to construe a prior performance in the usual
case as conditional, as opposed to being a further extension of the plaintiffs investment
in the creditworthiness of the defendant. It was also suggested that even where the prior
performance is truly conditional, the most the plaintiff gets, in the absence ofsome trust
or similar relationship, is a promise to return "it" should the condition obtain. As it will
be argued in the next sub-section, it makes sense sometimes to find such a promise in
the case of a price. But it is difficult to see how a defendant could actually make such
a promise where the prior performance is a service. There is no "it" to return.
c. Tfc and the Profit from Breach
Bush v. Canfieldt™ is an intriguing once-in-a-century American case which posed
the following problem: what if the plaintiff pays a price in advance and the defendant
breaches, in the circumstance where the defendant had a profitable contract? Can such
a defendant argue that the plaintiffs recovery must be adjusted to take account of the
plaintiffsexpected loss on the contract? There are several possible ways to answer "no"
to this question — which is, it is suggested, the correct response. Only two need be
mentioned. One is to say that this is a case of tfc and the plaintiff is entitled to
"rescind" the contract and sue in unjust enrichment to recover the price paid to the
defendant. This argument comes to the right response, and because of that it has added
to the general appeal of the unjust enrichment construal of the tfc argument. The second
approach is to analyze the prior payment as conditional, and as such, accompanied by
an implicit promise from the defendant to return it if the defendant does not perform
the explicit promise to sell. Do sellers actually make such implicit promises? It seems
that, quite obviously, they do. If this is in fact the case, then the justice of the buyer's
argument to get "the price" or "deposit" back is clear. The right to have "the" money
"back" is a contract damage argument based on the breach of the promise to return
"the" money if the seller fails to perform the promise to transfer title.
Those who take the opposite view use it as a springboard to establish a more general
form of the argument which says that plaintiffs may rescind on breach and recover in
restitution for any type of prior performance, services included, unlimited by contract
values. This can be seen to be erroneous for the reasons already expressed, namely, that
for there to be a truly conditional prior performance, it is essential that there be the
possibility of returning that performance and services, of course, cannot be returned.
2 Conn. 485 (S.C.E. 1818).
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d. Tfc and Proprietary Protection
There is a proprietary element to the unjust enrichment claim that has been
articulated in various ways over the past 100 years. Some aspects of "tracing" doctrines
and constructive trusts demonstrate this. For some who construe the tfc argument as
based in unjust enrichment, there is, then, naturally, a proprietary dimension to that
claim. This is a simple case of error compounding error. That the argument in favour
of proprietary protection is obviously suspect, flows from the fact that it seems to
permit a simple contract creditor to be transformed into secured creditor. One way,
perhaps, to enhance the plausibility of this proprietary element of the tfc claim is for
the plaintiff to argue that the plaintiffs prior performance was actually conditional, and
that on breach, the property in the plaintiffs prior performance somehow reverts to or
is "retroactively" vested in the plaintiff. The plausibility of this line of argument is
enhanced if the rescission fiction is applied uncritically. Construing the plaintiffs prior
performance as truly conditional by itself does not help bring about this odd result
since, even a conditional transfer, without more, entails only a promise to return the
performance when the relevant condition obtains. Two recent cases illustrate some of
the confusion that can arise on this score if the tfc doctrine is understood as an unjust
enrichment doctrine.
In Pan Ocean Shipping Ltd. v. Creditcorp,"' a charterer had paid charter payments
in advance to the defendant. The defendant was the assignee of the receivables of the
owner of the vessel. The vessel was off hire for a period of time due to the owner's
inability to pay for the required repairs. The charterers argued that they were entitled
to repudiate the contract and recover back the money paid in advance from the
defendant, as their money. The House of Lords properly held that the charterers' only
remedy was against the owner of the ship pursuant to the charterparty contract. Here
is a case, then, where plaintiffs counsel was led astray by the analysis that tfc is about
conditional payments that are recoverable in unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs counsel
argued, in effect, that it could avoid the downside of the risk it took in its contract with
the owner by paying in advance, by saying it still owned its performance.
Similarly, in Kensington v. Unrepresented Non-allocated Claimants™ the
defendant bank, which was insolvent and in receivership, had promised to sell gold
bullion to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs paid the price in advance. Because of the
insolvency, there was not enough gold for everyone, so the plaintiffs naturally sought
proprietary protection for their claims. One of many arguments they made was the tfc
argument. They said they still owned their prior performance on the basis of a
rescission-for-breach analysis. The argument was rejected summarily, but it is
interesting that it was rejected not because tfc is a contract damage rule and therefore
has no proprietary implications whatsoever; rather Lord Mustill appears to have
assumed that the tfc argument has something to do with unjust enrichment and held that
it was not applicable on the facts because there had not been a tfc.1" Interestingly,
111 [1994] II.LJ. No. 5, online: QL (HU).
'" Supra note 117.
The word "appears" is used because there is no explicit statement to confirm this analysis.
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he said that there was no tfc because the plaintiffs had received what they had
bargained for — a promise to sell unascertained future goods. This holding will, no
doubt, get him in trouble with those who argue that tfc is about unjust enrichment,
since it completely undermines their argument. Tfc will never be available if the
"consideration" in tfc is construed to mean the defendant's promise and not her
performance.
e. Tfc and Mistake
The last area of the tfc problem concerns situations where a contract is void. One
party, thinking he is bound, performs and the other does not reciprocate. Recovery of
the performance in this instance, because of the mistake, is properly based in unjust
enrichment. Tfc is redundant. Many instances of recovery that are rationalized as tfc
are in fact cases where mistake provides the sole rationale.
In Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd.,™ a contract between the
plaintiff, Rover Ltd. and the defendant, Canon Films Sales Ltd., was declared void on
the basis that Rover Ltd. had not been incorporated at the date the contract was entered
into. For the sake of argument, assume this finding is valid and that this case, therefore,
is not susceptible to the kind of analysis applied to Deglman. The fact that the contract
was void was not known to either party. Over the course of the next several months,
the plaintiff paid a total of £312,500 to the defendant. It was held on the authority of
such cases as Rowland v. Divall"* and Warman v. Southern Counties Car Finance
Corporation Ltd.m that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of those payments on
the basis of a tfc. The plaintiff also recovered those payments on the basis that they had
been paid under a mistake of fact, the mistake being their belief in the valid
incorporation of the defendant company and therefore the existence of the contract.
Assuming the Court was correct to conclude that the contract was void, then the basis
of recovery could not have been contract because there was none. It had to be unjust
enrichment. Tfc, however, was not needed as an unjust factor, presuming that it could
intelligibly play that role, since without a contract, there was no juristic reason
supporting the transfer. The transfer had been made by mistake. Tfc does no normative
work.
f. Tfc Is a Mistake
The forgoing argument is intended to show three main points. The first is that in
most cases the tfc claim is a contract argument. The second point is that even when the
proper cause of action is unjust enrichment, the proper unjust factor is not tfc but
mistake. The third and larger intention of the forgoing is to show the impossibility of
sorting through the old doctrines without both a coherent structure and properly
formulated causes of action.
1)1 [19891 I W.LR. 912, 3 All E.R. 423 (C.A.).
'" Supra note 126.
"* [1949] 2 K.B. 576, 1 All E.R. 711.
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2. Fiduciary Obligation
The concept of "special" or "nominate" contract is merely the idea that there are
standard instances of standard contractual relations whose terms can be expressed and
fixed with considerable certainty at a certain level of abstraction. One can speak
intelligently and accurately of their essence, nature or form."7 With this notion comes
the idea that the legislator or court participates in the articulation of the form by
identifying its essence, by providing relevant and helpful suppletive terms, and by
regulating its use. Often, in the common law tradition, the first two ideas — essential
and suppletive terms — are conflated with a third and fourth, in the expression
"implied contract." The third idea is the notion that in certain circumstances a court
may infer that an actual agreement was reached by the parties, even though no words
were used to express it, (contracts implied in fact), and the fourth is the "unjust
enrichment" sense of quasi or implied contract. The historic conflation of all these ideas
in the term "implied contract" obstructs, among other things, the emergence of the more
coherent notion of special or nominate contract.1" This is, in sum, one of the
problems at the bottom of the suretyship and subrogation fiasco described above. A
second deeply entrenched mechanism contributes to the obstruction. Much of the law
of contract is over in Equity. The concepts of essential, suppletive and public order
term are frequently submerged over there in the word "equity." The leading example
of the harm caused by this failure to see the legal reality is common law's analysis of
the fiduciary obligation.139 The decision of Madam Justice McLachlin in Canson
exemplifies this type of analysis.140
As von Mchrcn & Gordley explain: "Since each 'natural' kind of contract served a distinct
purpose, each had its own set of rules, rules which must be followed for the purpose of that
particular kind of contract to be achieved, and which, accordingly, are intended by the parties in
the sense that they must intend what is necessary to achieve their purpose." A.T. von Mchrcn &
J.R. Gordley, The Civil Law System, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977) at 42.
For judicial recognition of some aspects this confusion, see e.g., Stanley Smith <S Sons v.
Limestone College, 283 S.C. 430 (C.A. 1984) at 435, Bell J., where the court states: "Historically
the form of action for this remedy was assumpsil, although no contract, express or implied, existed
between the plaintiff and defendant. Because of this quirk of common law pleading, the term
"contract implied in law" has been used to describe the circumstances under which the law
imposes un obligation to make restitution for a benefit received, notwithstanding the absence of
agreement between the parties. The unfortunate use of "implied contract" to connote both true
("implied in fact") and quasi ("implied in law") contracts has led to much confusion. The
distinction, however, is clear. A contract "implied in fact" arises when the assent of the parties is
manifested by conduct not words. A quasi contract, or one implied in law, is no contract at all..."
See also the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, supra note 21, § S comment (a): "Implied
contracts must be distinguished from quasi-contracts.... Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are
not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor
arc they promises. ... Such obligations were ordinarily enforced at common law in the same form
of action (assumpsit) that was appropriate to true contract, and some confusion with reference to
the nature of quasi-contracts has been caused thereby."
Sec, e.g., Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton <S Co., [19911 3 S.C.R. S34, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129
(hereinafter Canson].
Ibid.
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In that case, the court dealt with the extent of the liability of a fiduciary for losses that
would not have arisen but for his breach. These losses, however, were not reasonably
foreseeable by him at the date of breach. The specific question was whether his liability
in Equity for compensation was subject to some remoteness criterion. McLachlin J.
reasoned that the tort foreseeability criterion did not apply, but that liability would
extend only as far as permitted by a common sense appreciation of causation. She
wrote:
My first concern with proceeding by analogy with tort is that it overlooks the unique foundation and
goals of equity. The basis of the fiduciary obligation and the rationale for equitable compensation arc
distinct from the tort of negligence in contract. ... In short equity is concerned not only to compensate
the plaintiff but to enforce the trust which is at its heart.'"
In this passage, which is characteristic of the analysis of fiduciary obligations in the
common law tradition, the court is overlooking the fact that in most cases involving an
express fiduciary relation, the source of the obligation is a contract: the fiduciary's
obligation arises out of a promise that the fiduciary makes to the settlor or the
beneficiary. The nature and content of the promise, of course, are distinctive. The
trustee or fiduciary, in general, promises to act with loyalty and in the best interests of
the beneficiary. All that this establishes is that the content of the promise is different
from, for example, the content of the promise in the contract of sale. Yet clearly, the
fiduciary's contract is just another "special" contract and clearly its breach logically
results in the same categories of damages to the defendant — the loss of the
expectation and the loss due to essential and incidental reliance — that may arise in any
breach of any contract.142 The content of the expectation interest is different than in
the case of a contract of sale, but that is to be expected because this is a different
special contract. Likewise, the manner in which the reliance interest is injured and the
nature of the reliance interest injury will also be different than in the case of a contract
of sale. But again, this is to be expected. It does not follow from these important
differences however that, as McLachlin J. says, the "basis of the fiduciary obligation
and the rationale for equitable compensation are distinct...."143 It is, with respect, not
true to say of (negligence or) contract "that the parties are taken to be independent and
equal actors concerned primarily with their own self-interest"w unless all that is
meant to signify, is that the content of the promise of the fiduciary is different from the
content of the promise of a seller or the content of the duty we owe our neighbours.
Ibid, at S43.
Canadian courts have increasingly come to perceive the contractual origin of many fiduciary
duties. For example, in Hodgkinson, supra note 54 at 379, La Forest J. recognizes that "The
existence of a contract does not necessarily preclude the existence of fiduciary obligations between
parties. Indeed, the legal incidents of many contracts give rise to a fiduciary duty." This
recognition has not stopped the courts from letting this area turn into a largely discretional and
policy-based area of the law. Later on La Forest J. adds: "Policy considerations support fiduciary
relationships in the case of financial advisors. These arc occupations where advisors to whom a
person gives trust has power over vast sums of money, yet the nature of their position is such that
specific regulation might frustrate the very function they have to perform." Hodgkinson, supra note
54 at 381.
Canson, supra note 139 at 543.
Ibid.
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F. Problems in the definition of Tort
While the law of restitution has created fictional doctrines that obscure the contract
cause of action, it has also spawned doctrines that are really instances of fault. If a
contest were held to choose the common law concept that has caused the most
confusion or generated the most useless case law, "rescission" would probably win,
followed closely, no doubt, by "condition" and "consideration." "Restitution," if it
continues on its present path, shows great promise. The term "rescission" has at least
four distinct meanings: (1) rescission in the context of breach; (2) rescission in the
context of innocent misrepresentation; (3) rescission for mistake; and (4) rescission for
duress and misrepresentation. Like the "restitution" remedy, reference to it identifies
a number of different things while falsely conveying the impression of a unitary
concept. In recent years, writers have seized on the idea of rescission ab initio to
facilitate the jump from contract to restitution where there has been a contract induced
by fraud or duress, just as they have done, as illustrated above, where there has been
a breach resulting in tfc. Rescission, then, is another example of a law of remedies out
of control.
We raise the issue of rescission in the present context to make two brief points. The
first point, already suggested above, is that rescission ab initio is a fiction — nothing
the law does today can affect past events. It may be that the law wants to speak of a
solution to a case being "as though" the contract never existed, but if it does, it has a
duty to explain why and how this treatment is justified. That raises the second point.
The only instances where the "as though it had never existed" treatment is defensible
and useful as a metaphor is where the contract is induced by some wrong committed
by the defendant and is therefore itself the locus of the injury. In cases of fraud,
negligent misrepresentation and duress, the rescission ab initio intervention is justified
as a technique for reversing the harm caused by the wrong: since the harm is in, or just
is the contract caused by the wrong, the removal of the contract by the court exactly
compensates the plaintiff. Rescission ab initio in these cases, then, is justified as a tort
remedy, not as a restitution remedy. "5 Some, ultimately false, plausibility is given to
a restitution construal of these interventions through the notion that fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and duress, and associated concepts, are "vitiating" factors and
therefore "undermine" the contract. No one has yet provided a coherent account of what
a vitiated will is or looks like that does not also identify a civil wrong. Relying on that
very simple logic, there is no reason why the court should not remove the plaintiffs
promise from the defendant's patrimony (as well as the counter promise from the
plaintiffs) if that is the most effective way to do justice under the circumstances. Since
the civil wrong of the defendant caused the harmful contract (by making the plaintiff
take into account irrelevant considerations he was entitled to be free of), ridding the
world of the contract is a just exercise of state power.
This understanding makes intelligible the traditional restrictions on rescission, which presume for
the most part that the contract is not without effect pending the plaintiffs exercise of his right to
rescind. See Redgrave v. Hurd (Mil), 20 Ch. D. I, 51 LJ. Ch. 113 (C.A.).
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G. No agency of Change
The last barrier to the emergence of a cause of action in unjust enrichment is that
there is no ready agency in the tradition available to generate the transformation that
is required: the theory of the common law forbids such structural reform. Perhaps, as
with contract and civil responsibility, the reform can be achieved incrementally and
asymptotically. But this will be difficult due to two features of the current
circumstances. First, on the very best interpretation, common law private law is
distributed over a series of incommensurable categories: contract, tort, restitution (unjust
enrichment), property, and Equity. This mixed system of rule organization combines
four types of legal rules: one based on traditions of argument — Equity,146 another
based upon cause of actions or basic logics of legal argument — contract and tort; a
third based on a remedial response — restitution; and a fourth based on the regime of
entitlements —property. The next step in the further transformation of the common law
to a more rational organization is the integration of Equity into the law of obligations
and restitution into unjust enrichment. Second, this mixed system results in layers and
webs of rules which result, in turn, in overlapping rules, duplication, contradictions, and
rules at cross-purposes. In disentangling this, there will be an understandable reluctance
on the part of courts to discard doctrines for redundancy or inelegance for fear of
unintended and unanticipated repercussions somewhere else in the web. Executing this
task requires a confidence in the knowledge that the new paradigm or paradigms is
right or at least better. The switch to contract and fault was relatively easy since the
merits of the underlying principles are clear. This may or may not be the case with the
next steps in this process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sorting through the old law of quasi-contract and equitable remedies and
modernizing it requires definitive principles of selection and organization. Modernizing
the law will result in a transformation of the language of reasons and may result, no
doubt will result, in deciding that many old doctrines and decisions were mistaken. It
will not be enough, obviously, to take all the old outcomes as given, but it would also
be mistaken to think that, because of defects in the justificatory language, there is not
much wisdom in the old law either. This modernizing process has been readily
underway for the last fifteen years. The mistake now being made, however, is to
assume that any remedy in the common law that has a strong resemblance to restitution
must be based on the principle against unjust enrichment. This understanding of the
subject is leading to another generation of fictions all designed to tailor recalcitrant
cases and doctrines into an inadequate paradigm. In light of this, the argument of this
paper has been that the common law of restitution is in need of a reconceptualization
starting from the ground up. In this process, resort can be had to a number of guides
For example, F.W. Mailland defines Equity as "lhat body of rules administered by our English
[and Canadian] courts ofjustice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would
be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity": F. W. Mailland,
Equity, also The Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures (Cambridge:
University Press, 1909) at I.
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and constraints. These include: civil law methodologies and structure, a determination
to root out fictions,147 and the proper use of the other causes of action, contract and
civil responsibility. Using these techniques, we have defined what we believe to be the
proper cause of action in unjust enrichment — non-consensual receipt and retention —
and enumerated some of the most glaring problems in the present law.
Perhaps the main difference between a civilian and common law mentality is that the
civilian puts greater faith in the idea that he is participating in an endeavour to identify
and articulate something that is real — private law — and that he is doing this in a
tradition that has for hundreds of years, more or less, believed this. The common
lawyer, in contrast, looks on private law as largely serving social and economic
purposes, external to itself, or, what is worse, as binding because the judge said so.
Although this functional/postitvist premise has elements of truth, it should not be
pursued to the near-exclusion of the realist point of view. The whig mentality of the
common lawyer compounds the error for he adopts the conceit that the responsiveness
and justness of the law evolves or progresses, over time, so that his current version is
more effective and more intelligent than that which existed ten or 100 years ago. Why
is "nineteenth century" (or "medieval") a derogatory term? In the law ofrestitution, this
mentality is merely a gross self-deception of a complacent style of private law which
refuses, just like Fuller and Purdue and Bullen and Leake, to take the reality of private
law seriously.
As P. Hirks notes in Dirks, Introduction, supra note IS at 7: "No subject can ever be rationally
organized or intelligibly applied so long as it is dominated by the language of fiction, of deeming,
and of unexplained analogy."
